This paper studies the recycling and remanufacturing mode and sales channel issues in the closed-loop supply chain. Specifically, this study establishes an e-commerce closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, and divides the recycling model into recycling by the manufacturer or recycling by the platform. Considering two common sales models in e-commerce platforms: the resale model and agency model, combined with the recycling model, four different research scenarios are formed. We use backward induction to solve the Stackelberg game problem and explore the remanufacturing and channel strategies of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform. The research results show that for the manufacturer, under the same recycling model, when consumers’ preference for remanufactured products and the sensitivity of recycling volume to recycling prices are low, he will prefer the resale model. Under the same sales model, the manufacturer always prefers the recycling model in which he is responsible for recycling. However, the choice of platform is contrary to that of the manufacturer. In the resale model, both the manufacturer and the platform will choose to recycle by themselves, which cannot achieve a win-win situation. Under the agency model, when consumers’ preference for remanufactured products is high and the sensitivity coefficient of recycling volume to recycling price is low, supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation, and the scope of the win-win situation decreases as the unit production cost of new products increases. In addition, rising consumer preference for remanufactured products will lead to lower consumer surplus.

Comprehensive understandings about how to realize service capability greenness in the telecom sector are still rare. In this paper, a non-serial telecom supply chain consisting of an infrastructure supplier, a content provider and a telecom operator is formulated under environmental regulation. The telecom operator aims to find the optimal green procurement ratio between traditional and green equipment. Some common real-life situations are assumed, and the service capacity greenness problems are solved by game theory regarding coordination and interaction among supply chain partners. The results show that the prevailing concern of managers’ “energy saving is not money saving” is the direct reason for a mixed purchase strategy. Further, when diseconomy of purchasing energy-saving equipment reaches a certain threshold, tightening environmental regulation may cause telecom companies to reduce the proportion of energy-saving equipment purchased. Finally, the telecom sector is characterized by its booming service capacity per equipment, which benefits green purchase ratio greatly. When the other six influencing factors are relatively stable, the driving force of telecommunication technology update will push the telecom sector to a greener future.

Manufacturer channel encroachment is a common phenomenon in the current e-commerce supply chain, which has been well studied. This study develops a multi-agent-based model of the e-platform supply chain to analyse manufacturers’ channel encroachment strategies and supply chain evolution. Through both direct sales channels and e-commerce platforms, manufacturers can sell two complementary products of varying quality. Consumers who have preferences compare the pricing information gathered from manufacturers through different channels before selecting the one that generates the best utility. At the end of each period, the manufacturers make a price adjustment using the genetic algorithm. We look at the supply chain evolution process through multi-period simulations and discuss the factors that influence encroachment decisions. We find that manufacturers’ channel encroachment is detrimental to the profitability of the e-commerce platform. Consumers’ channel preferences and quality preferences benefit the e-commerce platform and can discourage manufacturers’ encroachment decisions. In addition, increases in encroachment costs and commission rates can reduce manufacturers’ propensity for channel encroachment.