Federations among sets of Cloud Providers (CPs), whereby a set of CPs agree to mutually use their own resources to run the VMs of other CPs, are considered a promising solution to the problem of reducing the energy cost. In this paper, we address the problem of federation formation for a set of CPs, whose solution is necessary to exploit the potential of cloud federations for the reduction of the energy bill. We devise an algorithm, based on cooperative game theory, that can be readily implemented in a distributed fashion, and that allows a set of CPs to cooperatively set up their federations in such a way that their individual profit is increased with respect to the case in which they work in isolation. We show that, by using our algorithm and the proposed CPs' utility function, they are able to self-organize into Nash-stable federations and, by means of iterated executions, to adapt themselves to environmental changes. Numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.

Cloud computing is growing in popularity among computing paradigms for its appealing property of considering "Everything as a Service". The goal of a Cloud infrastructure provider is to maximize its profit by minimizing the amount of violations of Quality-of-Service (QoS) levels agreed with service providers, and, at the same time, by lowering infrastructure costs. Among these costs, the energy consumption induced by the Cloud infrastructure, for running Cloud services, plays a primary role. Unfortunately, the minimization of QoS violations and, at the same time, the reduction of energy consumption is a conflicting and challenging problem. In this paper, we propose a framework to automatically manage computing resources of Cloud infrastructures in order to simultaneously achieve suitable QoS levels and to reduce as much as possible the amount of energy used for providing services. We show, through simulation, that our approach is able to dynamically adapt to time-varying workloads (without any prior knowledge) and to significantly reduce QoS violations and energy consumption with respect to traditional static approaches.

In this paper we deal with the problem of making a set of Fog Infrastructure Providers (FIPs) increase their profits when allocating their resources to process the data generated by IoT applications that need to meet specific QoS targets in face of time-varying workloads. We show that if FIPs cooperate among them, by mutually sharing their workloads and resources, then each one of them can improve its net profit. By using a game-theoretic framework, we study the problem of forming stable coalitions among FIPs. Furthermore, we propose a mathematical optimization model for profit maximization to allocate IoT applications to a set of FIPs, in order to reduce costs and, at the same time, to meet the corresponding QoS targets. Based on this, we propose an algorithm, based on cooperative game theory, that enables each FIP to decide with whom to cooperate in order to increase its profits. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated through an experimental evaluation considering various workload intensities. The results we obtain from these experiments show the ability of our algorithm to form coalitions of FIPs that are stable and profitable in all the scenarios we consider.