A graphene coated microfiber Bragg grating (GMFBG) for gas sensing is reported in this Letter. Taking advantage of the surface field enhancement and gas absorption of a GMFBG, we demonstrate an ultrasensitive approach to detect the concentration of chemical gas. The obtained sensitivities are 0.2 and 0.5 ppm for ${\mathrm{NH}}_3$ and xylene gas, respectively, which are tens of times higher than that of a GMFBG without graphene for tiny gas concentration change detection. Experimental results indicate that the GMFBG-based ${\mathrm{NH}}_3$ gas sensor has fast response due to its highly compact structure. Such a miniature fiber-optic element may find applications in high sensitivity gas sensing and trace analysis.

A fiber-optic humidity sensor has been fabricated by coating a moisture sensitive polymer film to the fiber Bragg grating (FBG). The Bragg wavelength of the polyimide-coated FBG changes while it is exposed to different humidity conditions due to the volume expansion of the polyimide coating. The characteristics of sensors, including sensitivity, temporal response, and hysteresis, were improved by controlling the coating thickness and the degree of imidization during the thermal curing process of the polyimide. In the relative humidity (RH) condition ranging from 11.3%RH to 97.3% RH, the sensitivity of the sensor was about 13.5 pm/% RH with measurement uncertainty of ±1.5% RH.

Precise and secure time synchronization between two remote sites is necessary in many practical scenarios. Recently, the two-way fiber time transfer (TWFTT) system has become an attractive option for high-precision time synchronization. However, TWFTT is implemented based on symmetric link assumption, and such assumption may be maliciously utilized to cause significant time asynchronization to TWFTT. In this paper, we propose two novel controllable asymmetry attack schemes for TWFTT, namely, the link asymmetry attack and the attenuation asymmetry attack. We theoretically analyze the controllability and the effectiveness of these two attacks. Experimental results show that our link asymmetry attack can introduce 2.49 ns time offset per asymmetric link length (in meters), and our attenuation asymmetry attack can introduce at most 36.6 times time offset (compared to normal situation) when the attenuation is 45.3%. Our work can provide instructive insights for future studies of protecting TWFTT from delay asymmetry attacks.