In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one’s coworkers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institution
We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truthtelling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson (1999) in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants of the NRMP truthfully reveal their preference
Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. Our results build upon and extend those obtained for cartesian product ranges by Border and Jordan (1983). By admitting a large set of non-cartesian ranges, we give a partial answer to the major open question left unresolved in this pioneering article. We prove that our class is composed by generalized median voter schemes which satisfy an additional condition, called the intersection property (Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997)
We thank José Alcade, Carmen Beviá, Flip Klijn, David Pérez-Castrillo, Howard Petith, Alvin Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, and an associate editor for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to an anonymous referee whose suggestions and comments helped to improve the paper considerably. Financial support through a grant from the Programa de Cooperación Científica Iberoamericana is acknowledged. The work of Jordi Massó is also partially supported by Research Grants PB96-1192 from the Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica, Spanish Ministry of Education, and SGR98-62 from the Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca de la Generalitat de Catalunya. The paper was partially written while Alejandro Neme was visiting the UAB under a sabbatical fellowship from the Spanish Ministry of Education.Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be “single” in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms
The work of S. Barberà and J. Massó is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, through grant BEC2002-02130, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant 2001SGR-00162 and the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA). The work of A. Neme is partially supported by the Universidad Nacional de San Luis through grant 319502, by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas CONICET, through grant PICT-02114, and by the Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Técnica, through grant 03-10814. All authors acknowledge financial support from the grant PCI España-Iberoamérica 2003 (Programa de Cooperación Interuniversitaria de la Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional - AECI).We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters’ preferences are separable or additively representable