The cosmological principle (CP)—the notion that the Universe is spatially isotropic and homogeneous on large scales—underlies a century of progress in cosmology. It is conventionally formulated through the Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) cosmologies as the spacetime metric, and culminates in the successful and highly predictive Λ-Cold-Dark-Matter (ΛCDM) model. Yet, tensions have emerged within the ΛCDM model, most notably a statistically significant discrepancy in the value of the Hubble constant,H0. Since the notion of cosmic expansion determined by a single parameter is intimately tied to the CP, implications of theH0tension may extend beyond ΛCDM to the CP itself. This review surveys current observational hints for deviations from the expectations of the CP, highlighting synergies and disagreements that warrant further study. Setting aside the debate about individual large structures, potential deviations from the CP include variations of cosmological parameters on the sky, discrepancies in the cosmic dipoles, and mysterious alignments in quasar polarizations and galaxy spins. While it is possible that a host of observational systematics are impacting results, it is equally plausible that precision cosmology may have outgrown the FLRW paradigm, an extremely pragmatic but non-fundamental symmetry assumption.
The Event Horizon Telescope (EHT) has led to the first images of a supermassive black hole, revealing the central compact objects in the elliptical galaxy M87 and the Milky Way. Proposed upgrades to this array through the next-generation EHT (ngEHT) program would sharply improve the angular resolution, dynamic range, and temporal coverage of the existing EHT observations. These improvements will uniquely enable a wealth of transformative new discoveries related to black hole science, extending from event-horizon-scale studies of strong gravity to studies of explosive transients to the cosmological growth and influence of supermassive black holes. Here, we present the key science goals for the ngEHT and their associated instrument requirements, both of which have been formulated through a multi-year international effort involving hundreds of scientists worldwide.
A common adage runs that, given a theory manifesting symmetries, the syntax of that theory should be modified in order to construct a new theory, from which symmetry-variant structure of the original theory has been excised. Call this strategy for explicating the underlying ontology of symmetry-related models reduction. Recently, Dewar has proposed an alternative to reduction as a means of articulating the ontology of symmetry-related models—what he calls (external) sophistication, in which the semantics of the original theory is modified, and symmetry-related models of that theory are treated as if they are isomorphic. In this paper, we undertake a critical evaluation of sophistication about symmetries—we find the programme underdeveloped in a number of regards. In addition, we clarify the interplay between sophistication about symmetries, and a separate debate to which Dewar has contributed—viz., that between interpretational versus motivational approaches to symmetry transformations.
According to the standard model of cosmology, $$\Lambda $$ CDM, the mass-energy budget of the current stage of the universe is not dominated by the luminous matter that we are familiar with, but instead by some form of dark matter (and dark energy). It is thus tempting to adopt scientific realism about dark matter. However, there are barely any constraints on the myriad of possible properties of this entity—it is not even certain that it is a form of matter. In light of this underdetermination I advocate caution: we should not (yet) be dark matter realists. The “not(-yet)-realism” that I have in mind is different from Hacking’s (Philos Sci 56 (4), 555–581, 1989) anti-realism, in that it is semantic rather than epistemological. It also differs from the semantic anti-realism of logical empiricism, in that it is naturalistic, such that it may only be temporary and does not automatically apply to all other unobservables (or even just to all other astronomical unobservables, as with Hacking’s anti-realism). The argument is illustrated with the analogy of the much longer history of the concept of a gene, as the current state of the concept of dark matter resembles in some relevant ways that of the early concept of genes.