Developing a novel conceptualization of ‘de-Europeanisation’, this introduction provides a common theoretical framework to advance our understanding of EU foreign policy-making in times of internal and external challenges. De-Europeanisation relates to situations where EU foreign policy-making runs against the grain of certain Member States’ declared values and interests; where Member States are less willing to engage in collective foreign policy-making at the EU-level, prioritising other multilateral frameworks or (unilateral) national actions; and where the results of that policy-making are, on occasion, explicitly undermined by Member State practice. Departing from the understanding that (de)Europeanisation is an overarching ‘framework’ rather than a theory, authors focus on – and theorize about – different ‘drivers’, ‘elements’ and ‘dynamics’ of de-Europeanisation’. The theoretical framework developed in this introduction provides guidance for the following individual articles, which are mapped against a common understanding of de-Europeanisation and which locate themselves within the overarching conceptual framework. This will allow for a systematic analysis, comparison and evaluation across the different case studies included in this special issue.
21 November 2011 in Journal of European Public Policy
How can we better understand weaknesses in the democratic legitimacy underpinning European Union (EU) foreign, security and defence policy? The argument presented here is that this weakness can in part be seen as a function of poor narrative construction in Europe. The nascent European public space does not yet provide a solid foundation from which such narratives might be established, contested and developed and from which they might aspire to some hegemony. Instead, the Union remains reliant upon an unstable intersection of national foreign policy narratives and the weak instantiation of an élite European narrative based on exceptionalism. This fails to create a sense of ownership and legitimacy over the international actions of the Union, adversely impacting its effectiveness and credibility. The élite narrative has solid roots in policy, academic and specialist constituencies but is weakly disseminated and vigorously contested.
The 2016 decision of the UK electorate to withdraw from the European Union drew to a halt a decades-long process of shared Irish/UK Europeanisation. Brexit also posed near existential challenges to the Irish state across the public policy spectrum, initiating something of a debate on Ireland’s strategic position vis á vis the UK and EU26 and the future of the Irish peace process. This paper seeks to assess the emotional content of these debates surrounding the impact of the Brexit crisis on bilateral British–Irish relations and the mediating role of Ireland’s EU membership in the Union’s subsequent negotiations with the UK. The article will argue that Brexit shattered newly developed and instantiated emotion norms, resulting in some reversion to earlier historical emotional patterns but then also a reversal in emotional stereotypes which had long define the bilateral relationship.
Summary: The strengthened Office of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the new European External Action Service (EEAS) presuppose a set of interests and/or values that the European Union (EU) wishes to pursue on the world stage. But what are those interests and/or values and how does the EU reach agreement on them? Rather than simply ‘cutting and pasting’ from EU treaties and strategy papers, this article identifies seven distinct theoretical models of how the EU and its member states arrive collectively at a definition of their diplomatic objectives. The seven models include intergovernmentalist models of veto threats and log-rolling, normative institutionalist models of cooperative bargaining and entrapment, and constructivist and sociological institutionalist models of elite socialization, Europeanization and collective identity formation. The article identifies the logics of each model and notes their implications for the role of the EU’s new foreign policy institutions.