This study aims to investigate the hypothesis that “thinking in opposites” might facilitate insight problem solving. For example, if the image relating to a problem is oriented horizontally, it may be that making it vertical makes it easier to see the solution. We focus on visuo-spatial insight problem solving and study four conditions (training vs. hint, overt vs. covert identification of opposites) which differ in terms of the participants’ awareness of how considering the opposites relating to a problem might lead to possible representational transformations which would help them in their search for the solution. The training condition was associated with a greater proportion of correctly solved problems. Participants who found the solution after training also made fewer attempts and did it in a shorter time. Furthermore, they referred more frequently to the instructions they had received to use opposites and made more use of the opposites they had listed in their initial exploration (overt listing condition). Overall the results show that suggesting to the participants that they “think in opposites” worked better when it was proposed as an explicit, systematic strategy.
This paper aims to test whether the use of contraries can facilitate spatial problem solving. Specifically, we examined whether a training session which included explicit guidance on thinking in contraries would improve problem solving abilities. In our study, the participants in the experimental condition were exposed to a brief training session before being presented with seven visuo-spatial problems to solve. During training it was suggested that it would help them to find the solution to the problems if they systematically transformed the spatial features of each problem into their contraries. Their performance was compared to that of a control group (who had no training). Two participation conditions were considered: small groups and individuals. Higher success rates were found in the groups exposed to training as compared to the individuals (in both the training and no training conditions), even though the time required to find a solution was longer. In general, participants made more attempts (i.e. drawings) when participating in groups than individually. The number of drawings done while the participants were trying to solve the problems did not increase after training. In order to explore if the quality (if not the number) of drawings was modified, we sampled one problem out of the seven we had used in the experiment (the “pigs in a pen” problem) and examined the drawings in detail. Differences between the training and no training conditions emerged in terms of properties focused on and transformed in the drawings. Based on these results, in the final discussion possible explanations are suggested as to why training had positive effects specifically in the group condition.
This study adds to the existing literature on the ability to understand irony of typically developing versus gifted students (aged 12–15). In addition to the canonical condition of polarized statements applied to oppositely polarized situations, we also considered the case of intermediate statements and situations. The results showed a significant difference between the two groups of participants. Both groups recognized an ironic interpretation in the more usual condition of a polarized statement applied to a clearly oppositely polarized situation and they also grasped the idea that the bigger the contrast, the more ironic the message. However, gifted students demonstrated greater mastery, with regard to both polarized and intermediate statements. They also demonstrated greater ability compared with their non-gifted peers in the task which required them to explain the “rule” underlying the conditions which applied to the comments they had judged as ironic and to then produce ironic stories demonstrating the specificity of irony (not to be confused with generic humor).
Our aim in this paper is to contribute toward acknowledging the general role of opposites as an organizing principle in the human mind. We support this claim in relation to human reasoning by collecting evidence from various studies which shows that “thinking in opposites” is not only involved in formal logical thinking, but can also be applied in both deductive and inductive reasoning, as well as in problem solving. We also describe the results of a series of studies which, although they have been developed within a number of different theoretical frameworks based on various methodologies, all demonstrate that giving hints or training reasoners to think in terms of opposites improves their performance in tasks in which spontaneous thinking may lead to classic biases and impasses. Since we all possess an intuitive idea of what opposites are, prompting people to “think in opposites” is something which is undoubtedly within everyone's reach and in the final section, we discuss the potential of this strategy and suggest possible future research directions of systematic testing the benefits that might arise from the use of this technique in contexts beyond those tested thus far. Ascertaining the conditions in which reasoners might benefit will also help in terms of clarifying the underlying mechanisms from the point of view, for instance, of analytical, conscious processing vs. automatic, unconscious processing.
This study examines the cognitive and affective commonalities and differences between humour and insight problems, focusing on the reasons given by the participants to explain their preferences. For both cartoons (study 1) and insight problems (study 2), the participants gave more reasons for liking than disliking something and the motivations for liking versus disliking did not always correspond. Many overlaps emerged between cartoons and insight puzzles in the categories relating to Curiosity, Violation of expectation, Virtuosity, Happiness related to superficial aspects and to content type confirming an overall similarity between these two “pleasures of the mind”. They are nevertheless distinct in terms of certain aspects. For instance, the most common reason for liking a cartoon was that it elicited a sense of general happiness and Lack of surprise more often motivated dislike for a cartoon, whereas Lack of joy of verification was the main reason for disliking an insight puzzle.