Adam Lovasz

Mr. Adam Lovasz

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 June 2023 in Kybernetes
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ALAdam Lovasz
Adam Lovasz
Purpose: Drawing on the work of Niklas Luhmann, the paper argues that technology can be viewed as a self-referential system which is autonomous from both human beings and other function systems of society. The paper aims to develop a philosophy of technology from the work of Niklas Luhmann. To achieve this aim, it draws upon the systems-theory work of Jacques Ellul, a philosopher of technology who focuses on the autonomous potential of technological evolution.Design/methodology/approach: The paper draws on the work of Niklas Luhmann and Jacques Ellul to explore the theme of autonomous technology and what this means for our thinking about technological issues in the twenty-first century. Insights from these two thinkers and researchers working in the Luhmannian sociological tradition are applied to remote work.Findings: The sociological approach of Luhmann, coupled with Ellul's insights into the autonomous nature of technology, can help us develop a systems theory of technology which takes seriously its irreducibility to human functions.Research limitations/implications: The paper contributes to the growing sociological literature that thematizes the Luhmannian approach to technology, helping us better understand this phenomenon and think in new ways about what technological autonomy means.Originality/value: The paper brings together the work of Luhmann, Ellul and contemporary researchers to advance a new understanding of technology and technological communication.

26 August 2024 in The Anthropocene Review
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MHMárk Horváth
Márk Horváth
ALAdam Lovasz
Adam Lovasz
Ever since its inception, the Anthropocene as a concept has proven divisive among researchers in both the natural sciences and humanities. While some accept its validity, integrating the Anthropocene into a broader postanthropocentric turn alongside related ideas such as posthumanism, others reject the Anthropocene as somehow incriminating a collective ‘humanity’ as a whole. For its critics, the Anthropocene is a mistaken concept, because it is supposedly blind to historical, social and political factors. Jason W. Moore, a Marxist environmental historian, has argued for replacing the Anthropocene altogether, in favor of the ‘Capitalocene’. This would denote the causal effect capital accumulation exerts upon planetary processes. For Clive Hamilton, however, it is the Capitalocene which is too shallow. Similarly, Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that exclusively society- or history-centric ideas are not enough and fail to take account of the ways in which geological deep time radically transcends the bounds of human history. Chakrabarty admits the local relevance of critical theory – as do many Anthropocene researchers. Emphasizing the importance of social critique need not necessarily come at the expense of privileging a human temporal perspective In this article, we argue that the Capitalocene and related concepts fail to take account of how the Anthropocene challenges Western humanist meta-narratives of linear temporality, progress and emancipation.

1 October 2018 in Horror Studies
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ALAdam Lovasz
Adam Lovasz
Kiyoshi Kurosawa’s 2001 film, Kairo (Pulse), is an enigmatic piece of cinema. Even its genre cannot be neatly delineated. Part horror film, part art-house cinema, part social commentary, Kairo has a quality all of its own. While some commentators have identified the particular style of directing peculiar to the ‘other’ Kurosawa, even finding this mode of directing to be compatible with auteur modes of filmmaking, I seek to capture the singularity of the film’s content. In spite of the fact that Kurosawa as a director is notably repetitious in his choice of themes, the circumstance of repetition, as Gilles Deleuze reminds us in his 1969 book, Difference and Repetition, does not preclude the singular, evental nature of any and all such repetitions. Here I understand the phrase ‘repetition’ in the Deleuzian sense of the term, denoting a pure ‘difference without a concept’. Repetition is difference as it actualizes itself in the world. According to the Deleuzian view, underneath laws and generalities there may be found countless layers of singularities, processes and becomings that cannot be easily accessed. Obscurity, as I hope to show through numerous examples from Kairo’s screenplay, seems to be a pervasive phenomenon in Kurosawa’s apocalyptic vision of cybernetic society. Instead of connecting human beings with one another, information and communication technologies come to serve as conduits for spectral presences that produce new forms of disappearance. Productivity, far from being opposed to absence, is transformed during the course of the film into the virally proliferating production of nothing. For Deleuze, signs become deadly when they strike ‘with full force’. When the absolutely other strikes into the very heart of our Being, our very existence is endangered by machineries of abyssal replication. Every single character in Kairo is alienated from themselves and one another. The only vital, functioning form of community is, perversely, the realm of the dead, mediated by the transgressive power of cybernetic networks. As Valerie Wee has pointed out, the sense of lost community and the decline of tradition seems to be a salient theme of Kurosawa’s Kairo, as opposed to its rather more shallow 2006 American remake. Registering the circumstance of cultural decline and societal extinction, a very real phenomenon in early twenty-first-century Japan, should not be equated, however, with some form of nostalgic pining for a bygone era. Rather, I propose that we view Kairo as a deeply philosophical meditation on the posthuman condition, and the immanent possibilities of haunting repetitions lying beyond representation.

1 January 2023 in Journal of Libertarian Studies
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ALAdam Lovasz
Adam Lovasz
An early adopter of complexity theory in the social sciences, the Austrian school economist F. A. Hayek consciously strove to construct a grand synthesis, conceiving of society as an information system. I suggest that Hayek’s concept of complexity undergirds his promarket stances: it was his belief that because society is a complex information system, interventions which seek to transform the system as a whole inevitably run into insurmountable epistemological obstacles. Focusing mostly upon lesser-known texts dating from the 1950s and 1960s, I present a reading of Hayek concentrating on the role the concept of complexity plays in his work. Hayek viewed social complexity as inherently good and worthy of conservation from attempts to regulate society in various ways. Yet he also supported various forms of government interventionism. I argue that for Hayek complexity holds the key to determining which specific forms of intervention are permissible in Hayek’s vision of a classical liberal “Great Society.” On first impression, Hayek’s idea of complexity seems lopsided toward spontaneous order. However, he considered on multiple occasions the possibility of systemic chaos, unintended consequences of policy, and disequilibrium.

9 January 2023 in Literature
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ALAdam Lovasz
Adam Lovasz
In his main work, Matter and Memory, Henri Bergson presents a panpsychist ontology which cuts through the Gordian knot of the mind vs. matter problem. Taking this age-old philosophical topic, Bergson pushes the dualism of mind and matter beyond breaking point. Matter is reconceived as the sum of all images. Bergson introduces the dual concepts of cosmic “perception” and cosmic “memory”. Matter itself is reinterpreted as a continuum of all possible intensities of perception and memory. Bergson’s ontology has important epistemological ramifications. There is no sharp dividing line between consciousness and matter. In light of these insights, I propose a reading of Bergson’s relatively lesser-known lecture, “‘Phantasms of the Living’ and Psychical Research”, presented at the Society for Psychical Research in 1913. Here, Bergson elaborates upon the implications of his image-ontology for the possible post mortem fate of consciousness. In my concluding remarks, I suggest that Bergson’s observations may be of help in constructing an anti-reductionist and indeterministic epistemology.

1 January 2020 in HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology
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ALAdam Lovasz
Adam Lovasz
EUEötvös Lóránd University
Eötvös Lóránd University
I seek here to return to the original spirit of Edmund Husserl's "radicalism." To be radical means to be both rooted in a tradition and to retrace a path back to one's roots. According to the position I advocate, phenomenology may be reconceived of as an enterprise in realism. Through a creative rereading of one of phenomenology's founding texts, Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, I suggest that phenomenology can indeed provide us with a semantics applicable to realist ontologies, provided we excise phenomenological concepts from their subjectivist framework, providing a new structure with which to analyze reality. Specifically, Husserl's eidetic Apriori may be reconceived as denoting the inherent dynamism of existents. Movement would be the basis of manifestation, a universal category unconditioned in itself. That which appears need not be synonymous with all that which is given to experience. The eidos is the manifold of coiled movements awaiting manifestation, whilst the a priori is movement in itself. Following Graham Harman's lead, I expand the scope of the Husserlian idea of intentionality, reconceptualizing it as the directionality pertaining to any process whatsoever. Following Jaakko Hintikka, I take the cogito to be nothing other than performativity in its emergent state. Several different phenomenal horizons can connect to the same type of intentionality. The nonlinear nature of temporality means that even radically distant horizons are capable of sharing in the same intentionality. Once reenvisioned as a "genuine universal ontology" (this is Husserl's expression), phenomenological semantics can be extended to include any and all types of existents. First phenomenology need not maintain the primacy of perception or subjectivity.