For autonomous driving vehicles, there are currently some issues, such as limited environmental awareness and locally optimal decision-making. To increase the capacity of autonomous cars’ environmental awareness, computation, decision-making, control, and execution, intelligent roads must be constructed, and vehicle–infrastructure cooperative technology must be used. The Roadside unit (RSU) deployment, a critical component of vehicle–infrastructure cooperative autonomous driving, has a direct impact on network performance, operation effects, and control accuracy. The current RSU deployment mostly uses the large-spacing and low-density concept because of the expensive installation and maintenance costs, which can accomplish the macroscopic and long-term communication functions but fall short of precision vehicle control. Given these challenges, this paper begins with the specific requirements to control intelligent vehicles in the cooperative vehicle–infrastructure environment. An RSU deployment scheme, based on the improved multi-objective quantum-behaved particle swarm optimization (MOQPSO) algorithm, is proposed. This RSU deployment scheme was based on the maximum coverage with time threshold problem (MCTTP), with the goal of minimizing the number of RSUs and maximizing vehicle coverage of communication and control services. Finally, utilizing the independently created open simulation platform (OSP) simulation system, the model and algorithm’s viability and effectiveness were assessed on the Nguyen–Dupuis road network. The findings demonstrate that the suggested RSU deployment scheme can enhance network performance and control the precision of vehicle–infrastructure coordination, and can serve as a general guide for the deployment of RSUs in the same application situation.

In recent years, there has been significant development in intelligent technologies for urban traffic control, such as smart city and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. These advancements aim to provide more efficient and convenient services to participants in urban transportation. As the urban traffic control (UTC) system integrates with various networks and physical infrastructure, the potential threats of malicious attacks and breaches pose significant risks to the safety of individuals and their properties. To address this issue, this academic paper focuses on studying the network structure of the UTC system. A signal security game model is constructed based on the concepts of evolutionary game theory (EGT), involving three parties: attackers, upper computers (UC), and traffic signal machines (TSM). The model aims to analyze the evolutionary stability of the strategies chosen by each party, and to explore the relationships between various factors and the strategy choices of the three parties. Furthermore, the stability of equilibrium points in the three-party game system is analyzed using the Liapunov method. The conditions in which UC and TSM, dependent on detection rates and defense costs, choose to abandon defense at pure-strategy equilibrium points were obtained. Finally, MATLAB is utilized for simulation analysis to validate the impact of attack costs, defense costs, and detection rates on the information security of UTC systems.

The driving risk is assessed using the theory of unascertained measures to determine the presence of a conditional switch in the control system of a human‐machine codriving vehicle. Relevant risk indicators for driving are selected, including five driver‐related indicators and three vehicle‐related indicators. Subsequently, each indicator’s threshold range and associated risk level are analyzed and defined. The methodologies for establishing unascertained measure and their corresponding functions for both single and multiple indicator unascertained measure are then elucidated. A game theory–based weighting method is proposed, employing ordinal relationship analysis (ORA) and entropy weighting (EW) to determine indicator weights while utilizing confidence identification criteria to ascertain risk levels. Finally, experimental analyses are conducted on the driving risk assessment model, and the simulation results demonstrated the model’s ability to distinguish between normal and risky driving. In a continuous driving simulation, the model successfully identified a peak risk period (Level V) and, following a system alert, driving behavior returned to normal risk levels within 5 min. The model demonstrated utility for control switching decisions in human‐machine codriving scenarios, identifying instances where driver risk (Level IV) significantly exceeded vehicle risk (Level II), indicating a need to transfer control to the vehicle system. Consequently, the study’s findings can provide theoretical support for control switching mechanisms in human‐machine codriving vehicles.

The intersection traffic signal control is an essential means of urban traffic. To solve the problem of urban congestion, it is necessary to consider the optimal signal control strategy for intersections. Using the store-and-forward method of traffic control modeling, the in-queue vehicle number of the key signal phase as the payoff index, this paper designs an optimal intersection signal-timing strategy based on the game theory method. In this strategy, each key phase is regarded as a game player, and each player competes for the release time to maximize their own payoff and minimize the queue. To optimize the intersection efficiency, a game strategy is designed to achieve the Nash equilibrium state, which is the queueing equilibrium of each key phase. Finally, by VISSIM simulation, the total number of stops can be decreased by 5% to 10% compared with the MA-DD-DACC method.