Purpose: Livestreaming, as a relatively new online marketing model, has generated numerous business opportunities for e-commerce and social commerce. The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what degree livestreaming content impacts online users' cognitive and emotional reactions and whether their cognitive and emotional responses affect their purchase intention.Design/methodology/approach: Through the lens of regulatory focus theory (RFT) and stimulus–organism–response (S–O–R) theory, the authors empirically examine the influencing mechanisms of livestreaming on online consumers' purchase intentions. Structural equation models are used to analyze the relationships in the proposed research model.Findings: The results of this study show that information-task fit positively affects consumers' perceived usefulness of livestreaming. Both visual effects and sociability positively affect consumers' perceived value and social presence. Furthermore, perceived usefulness and perceived joy positively affect consumers' purchase intentions in a livestreaming environment. This study’s results also demonstrate that the regulatory focus of consumers has a moderating effect on the influence of their perceived joy on shopping intentions.Originality/value: This study contributes to the relevant literature by simultaneously examining the role of e-commerce platform characteristics and online consumer psychology in influencing behavioral intention. With a better understanding of their role, platform operators and sellers can refine their livestreaming marketing tools and strategies. Highlighting the interplays among external stimuli, user reactions and user motivational styles, this study contributes to mobile e-commerce literature and the broader literature on digital marketing and human–computer interaction.

We develop a model to evaluate the costs and benefits of disclosing information about audit quality. Specifically, we examine whether audit quality disclosure affects auditors' effort and investors' investment efficiency. In our setting, an auditor exerts unobservable effort to influence audit quality and is motivated by liability in the event of audit failure. The usefulness of audited financial reports for investors depends on both the quality of the underlying financial reporting (e.g., as embodied by GAAP) and the quality of auditors' reports (i.e., the likelihood with which audit evidence uncovers managerial misreporting). We show that audit quality disclosure increases auditors' effort incentives if and only if the underlying financial reporting quality is relatively weak. We also show that such disclosure can actually reduce investment efficiency. Our analyses contribute to the debate about policies aimed at improving audit transparency.

We explicitly model financial reporting discretion and earnings management in an investment setting where managers have incentives to behave myopically. We show that when managers are sufficiently, but not excessively, myopic, granting them some discretion over the mandatory financial reports can lead to better investment decisions. This finding contrasts with the conventional argument that financial reporting discretion facilitates earnings management and exacerbates managerial myopia, leading to inefficient investments. Costly earnings management, while offering managers some ex post protection against bad luck by decreasing the incidence of low financial reports, reduces the expected net benefit of high financial reports ex ante. Consequently, managers with negative private information find it too costly to mimic those with positive private information, facilitating separation of managers through efficient investment. Thus, curbing managerial myopia by removing or overly restricting earnings management may have the unintended consequence of impairing investment efficiency.

We examine the effects of asymmetric timeliness in reporting good versus bad news on price informativeness when prices provide useful information to assist firms’ investment decisions. We find that a reporting system featuring more timely disclosure of bad news than of good news encourages speculators to trade on their private information. Consequently, it generates a higher expected investment level and firm value. Our analysis generates predictions consistent with empirical findings and provides a justification for the more timely reporting of bad news in the absence of managerial incentive problems.This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.