Jianhui Xu

Dr. Jianhui Xu


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 August 2023 in Health Affairs
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MMMark Katz Meiselbach
Mark Katz Meiselbach
YWYang Wang
Yang Wang
JXJianhui Xu
Jianhui Xu
GBGe Bai
Ge Bai
GAGerard F. Anderson
Gerard F. Anderson
Most major insurers operate in both the commercial health insurance and Medicare Advantage (MA) markets. We investigated the ratio of commercial-to-MA prices negotiated by the same insurer, in the same hospital and for the same services, using 2022 price information disclosed by hospitals in compliance with the hospital price transparency rule. Insurers negotiated median hospital prices for commercial plans that were two to three times higher than their MA prices in the same hospital for the same service. The median commercial-to-MA price ratio in the same hospital varied, from 1.8 for surgery and medicine services to 2.2 for laboratory tests and emergency department visits and 2.4 for imaging services. In multivariable Poisson regression analysis, higher ratios were associated with system-affiliated, nonprofit, and teaching hospitals, as well as with large national insurers. These findings reflect the differences in financial incentives and regulatory policies in the commercial and MA markets. Because insurers respond to differing incentives by obtaining different negotiated prices across markets, policy and practice efforts that alter incentives for insurers may have the potential to lower commercial prices.

18 August 2023 in Medical Care Research and Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YWYang Wang
Yang Wang
MMMark K. Meiselbach
Mark K. Meiselbach
JXJianhui Xu
Jianhui Xu
GBGe Bai
Ge Bai
GAGerard Anderson
Gerard Anderson
This study examined if greater insurer market power was associated with consistently lower negotiated prices within each hospital for 44 shoppable and emergency procedures, using price transparency data disclosed by 1,506 hospitals in metropolitan areas. We used multi-level fixed effects models to estimate the within-hospital variation in plan-level insurer-negotiated prices (from the largest insurer, the second largest insurer, other major insurers, and nonmajor insurers) and cash-pay prices as a function of insurer market power. For shoppable services, relative to nonmajor insurers, the largest, second largest, and other major insurers negotiated 23%, 16%, and 3% lower prices, respectively, while cash prices were 17% higher. For emergency room visits, while the largest insurers paid 5% less than nonmajor insurers, the second largest and other major insurers did not pay lower prices. Stratified analyses by type of shoppable services found varying magnitudes and patterns of price discounts associated with insurer market power.

3 December 2023 in Health Services Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LNLauren Hersch Nicholas
Lauren Hersch Nicholas
DPDan Polsky
Dan Polsky
MDMichael Darden
Michael Darden
JXJianhui Xu
Jianhui Xu
KAKelly Anderson
Kelly Anderson
DMDavid J. Meyers
David J. Meyers

3 November 2023 in JAMA Health Forum
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JXJianhui Xu
Jianhui Xu
KAKelly E. Anderson
Kelly E. Anderson
ALAngela Liu
Angela Liu
BMBrian J. Miller
Brian J. Miller
DPDaniel Polsky
Daniel Polsky
Importance: Unlike traditional Medicare (TM), Medicare Advantage (MA) plans limit in-network care to a specific network of Medicare clinicians. MA plans thus play a role in sorting patients to a subset of clinicians. It is unknown whether the performance of physicians who treat MA and TM beneficiaries is different.Objective: To examine whether avoidable hospital stay differences between MA and TM can be explained by the primary care clinicians who treat MA and TM beneficiaries.Design, Setting, and Participants: This was a cross-sectional study of a nationally representative sample of MA and TM beneficiaries in 2019 with any of 5 chronic ambulatory care–sensitive conditions (ACSCs). The relative risk (RR) of avoidable hospital stays in MA compared with TM was estimated with inverse probability of treatment-weighted Poisson regression, both without and with clinician fixed effects. The degree to which the estimated MA vs TM difference could be explained by patient sorting was calculated by comparing the 2 RR estimates. Data were analyzed between February 2022 and April 2023.Exposure: Enrollment in MA.Main Outcome and Measures: Whether a beneficiary had avoidable hospital stays in 2019 due to any of the ACSCs. Avoidable hospital stays included both hospitalizations and observation stays.Results: The study sample comprised 1 323 481 MA beneficiaries (mean [SD] age, 75.4 [7.0] years; 56.9% women; 69.3% White) and 1 965 863 TM beneficiaries (mean [SD] age, 75.9 [7.4] years; 57.1% women; 82.5% White). When controlling for the primary care clinician, the RR of avoidable hospital stays in MA vs TM changed by 2.6 percentage points (95% CI, 1.72-3.50; P < .001), suggesting that compared with TM beneficiaries, MA beneficiaries saw clinicians with lower rates of avoidable hospital stays. This effect size was statistically significant to explain the 2% lower rate of avoidable hospital stays in MA than in TM.Conclusions and Relevance: In this cross-sectional study of MA and TM beneficiaries, the lower rate of avoidable hospital stays among MA beneficiaries than TM beneficiaries was attributable to MA beneficiaries visiting clinicians with lower rates of avoidable hospital stays. The patient sorting that occurs in MA plays a critical role in the lower rates of avoidable hospital stays compared with TM.

9 February 2023 in Medical Care Research and Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JXJianhui Xu
Jianhui Xu
DPDaniel Polsky
Daniel Polsky
As Medicare Advantage (MA) plans enroll an increasingly large share of Medicare beneficiaries, how much providers charge MA plans relative to Traditional Medicare (TM) has important policy implications. We used new price transparency data from hospitals—which contain the most up-to-date negotiated prices—to evaluate whether and how MA prices differed from TM for hospital outpatient services. We found that among the 1,135 hospitals in our sample, MA prices were close to TM at about half of them, but the other half reported MA prices that deviated considerably from TM, predominantly in the direction of higher rather than lower, and rural hospitals were more likely than urban ones to charge high MA markups. Our findings also suggest that hospital price transparency data hold promise for promoting price shopping among MA beneficiaries. But greater hospital compliance and more standardized reporting are necessary for the data to be a more useful tool.

22 August 2019 in Medical Care Research and Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JXJianhui Xu
Jianhui Xu
ETErin Trish
Erin Trish
GJGeoffrey Joyce
Geoffrey Joyce
Beginning with the 2018 benefit year, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services started incorporating select prescription drug utilization information into the Marketplace risk adjustment model. There has been little evidence about the impact of this change on payment accuracy and the mechanisms through which it may occur. Using commercial claims in 2017 from a large national health insurer, we find that the policy change improves payment accuracy in our sample and would help mitigate insurers’ selection incentives for some enrollees through two channels: imputing missing diagnoses and varying risk scores to better capture the heterogeneity in expenditures among patients with certain health conditions. However, while improving payment accuracy overall, there are potential perverse incentives that could distort treatment choice for marginal patients. Additionally, overcompensation and undercompensation persists for certain patient subgroups, suggesting an opportunity to further refine and improve the model.