This article traces the evolution of pollution auctions. The article examines how auction design began with an initially simple auction format and has progressed over time, focusing on auct...
We investigate observed rent dissipation—the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent—in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can exhibit observed over-dissipation if the contested rent is below a threshold and yet observed under-dissipation with large rents: the nature of preferences implies contestants are relatively effortful in contesting small rents. Considering more general preferences in contests thus allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradox—where rent-seeking levels are relatively small despite the contested rent being sizeable—with observed over-dissipation of rents in experimental settings, where contested rents are arguably small.
25 March 2022 in Environmental and Resource Economics
This article investigates cap-and-trade markets in the presence of both political and market distortions. We create a model where dominant firms have the ability to rent seek for a share of pollution permits as well as influence the market equilibrium with their choice of permit exchange because of market power. We derive the equilibrium and show the interaction of these two distortions has consequences for the resulting marginal inefficiency—the extent to which a re-allocation of permits between firms can reduce equilibrium abatement costs. We find that if the regulator is not very responsive to rent seeking then marginal inefficiency reduces relative to the case without rent seeking. When the regulator is very responsive to rent seeking, if dominant rent-seeking firms are all permit buyers (sellers) then marginal inefficiency reduces (increases) relative to the case without rent seeking.