Small and Medium Businesses (SMB) use Internet and computer-based tools in their daily processes, sometimes without being aware to the cyber threats, or without knowing how to be prepared in case of a cyber-attack, although they are a major target for cyber-attacks. Specific information about cybersecurity needed by SMBs, in order to cope with cyber threats, is not always available or easily accessible. In this study, a vast search of different types of information about SMBs’ cybersecurity was performed, in order to find whether a hole of accessible information exists in this area. This exploratory research covered general mass communication media channels, technological and professional cybersecurity websites, and academic journals, and found that indeed very few studies, articles and news items were published in this matter. Leveraging knowledge and awareness, diminishing the shame for reporting cyber-attacks, and increasing mass communication media interest and public attention, may be activities to cover this “invisible hole”.

Povzetek: Palestinska militantna skupina Hamas je 7. oktobra 2023 začela obsežno skupno ofenzivo proti Izraelu. Hkrati s kinetičnimi napadi so različni povzročitelji kibernetskih groženj, ki jih pripisujejo Hamasu, Hezbolahu, Iranu in Rusiji, sprožili kibernetske napade na izraelske informacijske sisteme v komercialnem, industrijskem in vladnem sektorju. Ta prispevek analizira te kibernetske napade in izraelske protiukrepe na področju kibernetske varnosti. Čeprav je Izrael sicer vzdržal napad kibernetskega napadalca »digitalni 7. oktober«, ključne ugotovitve kažejo na to, da lahko tovrstni napadi znatno vplivajo na različne institucije in jim povzročijo škodo ter da je treba tako v Izraelu kot po svetu temeljito spremeniti opredelitev kibernetske obrambe in odpornosti, zlasti kar zadeva civilno družbo in infrastrukturo.

This study examines the cybersecurity insurance market in the United States (U.S.) in order to reveal if an “invisible hole” of services and information exists in this market. This is performed by mapping the cybersecurity insurance services, offered by insurance companies, to cope with cybersecurity risks, and finding in which way these services are exposed, visible and comprehensive, in the insurance companies' websites. The research questions examined the extent cybersecurity insurance services offered by the main U.S. insurance companies; the visibility of such services on their websites; and the types of services offered. The sample included 44 insurance companies based upon nine lists of the top U.S. insurance companies. The findings present that most companies (68%) offer cybersecurity insurance services, while only a few (26.92%) expose such information in a visible way. Moreover, on the one hand, the insurance companies use general terms for services, which may be blur and ambiguous, while on the other hand, there is a widespread of specific services, most of them (81%) provided only by few companies. These findings may derive due to insufficient understanding of cybersecurity insurance clients' needs and may reflect the lack of maturity of the cybersecurity insurance market, as matured marketplaces are mostly more standardized. This study demonstrates that there is a long way to advance until the insurance market for cybersecurity risks will be mature, customers (businesses and organizations) will understand the needs for such insurance, and insurance companies will develop and offer relevant insurance services.

Objective – The paper analyses the Iranian cyber-attacks in Albania, a small but strategically important nation in the Balkans. It examines the cyber incidents attributed to Iranian actors, highlighting the tactics employed, targeted sectors, and the objectives behind these operations. As geopolitical tensions between Iran and Albania have escalated in recent years, mainly due to Albania's support for an Iranian dissident group, Tehran has increasingly resorted to cyber warfare as a tool of influence and retaliation. By assessing the effectiveness of these cyber campaigns and their implications for Albania's national security, this study contributes to the broader understanding of how state-sponsored cyber activities are being used as foreign policy instruments. Goal – Through this analysis, the study aims to shed light on the complex dynamics of state-sponsored cyber aggression and its impact on national and regional security. It also examines cyber-attacks as a tool by foreign states, Iran in this case, to achieve political goals. In addition, the study emphasises the possibility of future Iranian cyber-attacks in other Balkan states to promote its strategy and that of its allies. Methodology – This study prioritised selecting diverse and reliable sources to ensure a comprehensive analysis. Sources were chosen based on their relevance to the research topic, reliability, and diversity, incorporating academic articles, analyses from cyber research companies, journalistic reports, and official publications. This approach ensured a balanced and trustworthy foundation for the research.

This study examines Russian cyber activities targeting European political elections, focusing on how Russia uses hacking, disinformation, and influence operations to undermine democratic institutions and sway public opinion. It highlights geographic hotspots in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans within the broader EU context. The research addresses key questions about the specific cyber tactics Russia employs and the legal and policy measures Europe has adopted to protect electoral integrity. The study maps Russian cyber threat actors and their strategies, assessing their operational objectives. It also evaluates existing national and EU-level legal frameworks and response mechanisms against foreign electoral interference. Methodologically, the study draws from a diverse range of reliable sources, including academic research, cybersecurity reports, journalism, and official publications, to provide a balanced and comprehensive analysis. Findings reveal that Russian cyber operations continuously and systematically target European elections using sophisticated methods. Current EU responses are fragmented, lack unified standards and enforcement, and create gaps in electoral security. The study argues for a holistic, multi-level European approach, emphasising the need for unified frameworks, permanent coordination, revised sanctions, and proportionate security measures. Ultimately, the research calls for an integrated European defence grounded in the rule of law, highlighting legally binding solidarity and institutional coherence among member states to strengthen democratic resilience.