Jinrong Liu

Prof. Dr. Jinrong Liu


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 February 2020 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JLJinrong Liu
Jinrong Liu
QXQi XU
Qi XU
Uncertainty in demand and high online return rates tend to generate a large inventory backlog after a hot selling season. Some well-known companies such as Burberry and H&M choose to burn these backlogs, which is very unfavorable to the sustainable development of enterprises and society. The omnichannel BOPS (Buy Online and Pickup in Store) provides consumers with a new and convenient choice of purchasing channels. Considering the probability of online return, we build expected profit models for retailers before and after opening a BOPS channel based on consumer surplus and purchase ratio via an online channel, store channel, and BOPS channel. Then, we prove the existence of optimal solutions and obtain the joint optimization decision on pricing and ordering. The results show that, under certain conditions, when the proportion of online channel buyers increases, the retailers’ optimal decision before opening a BOPS channel is to reduce the price and increase the order quantity, and the retailers’ optimal decision after opening a BOPS channel is to simultaneously reduce the price and the order quantity. Whether or not a BOPS channel is opened, when the purchase proportion of store channel increases, the optimal decision of retailers is to increase the price and order quantity at the same time. Furthermore, when the online return rate, the cost of online shopping, the inconvenient cost of the store channel, and the inconvenience of the BOPS channel relative to store channel increase, the optimal decision of retailers is to simultaneously reduce the price and order quantity. Moreover, when the maximum psychological value of the product increases, the optimal decision is to reduce the order quantity while increasing the price. In addition, the opening of a BOPS channel increases optimal price, optimal order quantity, and maximum expected profit.

10 January 2022 in Complexity
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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JLJinrong Liu
Jinrong Liu
QXQi Xu
Qi Xu
ZSZhongmiao Sun
Zhongmiao Sun
The isolation requirements of the coronavirus epidemic and the intuitive display advantages of live‐streaming have led to an increasing number of retailers shifting to social live‐streaming platforms and e‐commerce live‐streaming platforms to promote and sell their products in real time. However, the provision of live‐streaming services will also incur high live‐streaming effort costs. In this paper, we develop two decision models for retailers to sell goods through a single online shop and both online shop and live‐streaming room; we also present the optimal decisions of pricing and live‐streaming efforts. Furthermore, we identify the profitability conditions for retailers to determine when to provide live‐streaming services. In addition, we examine the impact of the provision of live‐streaming services on the optimal price and live‐streaming effort. We obtain three findings. First, there is a unique optimal decision on the price and live‐streaming effort under certain conditions. Second, when the effect coefficient of the live‐streaming room reaches a certain threshold, there are enough customers who enter the live‐streaming room to watch and buy and it is profitable for retailers to provide live‐streaming service. Finally, the optimal price and live‐streaming effort increase with the increase in average return loss, the effect coefficient of live‐streaming effort, and the extra return rate and decrease with the increase in the proportion of customers who choose to buy in the online shop and the price discount coefficient in the live‐streaming room.

8 August 2023 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ZSZhongmiao Sun
Zhongmiao Sun
QXQi XU
Qi XU
JLJinrong Liu
Jinrong Liu
Blockchain technology is very useful. This paper considers the application of blockchain technology to smart contracts, green certification, and market information disclosure, and introduces the carbon trading market price as a parameter to solve the dynamic incentive problem of the government for port enterprises to reduce emissions under the carbon trading policy. Based on the state change of port carbon emission reduction, this paper uses principal–agent theory to construct the dynamic incentive contract model of government without blockchain, with blockchain, and when carbon trading is considered under blockchain, respectively, and uses the optimal control method to solve and analyze the model. This paper finds that only when the opportunity cost of port enterprises is greater than a certain critical point and the fixed cost of blockchain is less than a certain critical point, the implementation of blockchain will help improve government efficiency. However, only when the critical value of carbon emission reduction of port enterprises and the unit operating cost of blockchain are small, the government should start the carbon trading market under blockchain technology. Through numerical simulation, this paper also finds that it is usually beneficial for the government to regulate and appropriately increase the carbon trading market price.

8 May 2025 in Environment, Development and Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ZSZhongmiao Sun
Zhongmiao Sun
BSBaoli Shi
Baoli Shi
JLJinrong Liu
Jinrong Liu

23 May 2025 in Symmetry
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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ZSZhongmiao Sun
Zhongmiao Sun
YXYike Xi
Yike Xi
BSBaoli Shi
Baoli Shi
JLJinrong Liu
Jinrong Liu
The shipping industry, a cornerstone of global trade, faces emissions reduction challenges amid tightening environmental policies. Blockchain technology, leveraging distributed symmetric architectures, enhances supply chain transparency by reducing information asymmetry, yet its dynamic interplay with emissions strategies remains underexplored. This study employs symmetry-driven differential game theory to model four blockchain scenarios in port-shipping networks: no blockchain (N), port-led (PB), shipping company-led (CB), and a joint platform (FB). By solving Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations, we derive optimal emissions reduction efforts, green investments, and blockchain strategies under symmetric and asymmetric decision-making frameworks. Results show blockchain adoption improves emissions reduction and service quality under cost thresholds, with port-led systems maximizing low-cost profits and shipping firms gaining asymmetrically in high-freight contexts. Joint platforms achieve symmetry in profit distribution through fee-trust synergy, enabling win–win outcomes. Integrating graph-theoretic principles, we have designed dynamic state equations for emissions and service levels, segmenting shippers by low-carbon preferences. This work bridges dynamic emissions strategies with blockchain’s network symmetry, fostering economic–environmental synergies to advance sustainable maritime supply chains.

13 October 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JLJinrong Liu
Jinrong Liu
The isolation requirements of the coronavirus epidemic and the advantages of direct display of live-streaming have promoted the rapid development of the live-streaming e-commerce. In this paper, we studied a live-streaming e-commerce supply chain system composed of a brand retailer and an Internet celebrity streamer, and develop and analyze the decision model for the retailer and streamer. The research results show that under certain conditions, there is an optimal joint decision on price discount, sales commission rate, and live-streaming effort. Furthermore, when the influence of the anchor and the live-streaming listing fee reach a specific threshold respectively, both the retailer and the streamer can make profits. In addition, the optimal decision and maximum profit increase with the increase of the streamer's influence and live-streaming effort effect, and decrease with the increase of the unit cost of live-streaming effort. Finally, several managerial implications are proposed.