Significance: How do democracies make decisions? We can read transcripts from parliament houses and legislative halls to see how particular ideas are introduced and debated, but we understand very little about the general principles of how these systems deal with information, or the origins of those principles. Here we study the parliamentary assembly of the first 2 years of the French Revolution, a model for democracies and revolutions across the globe, and show how patterns of speaking are created, picked up, and ignored or propagated. Political ideology, top–down rules, and individual charisma all affect how word patterns survive and thrive or, conversely, disappear and drop away.
19 October 2022 in Journal of The Royal Society Interface
A wide variety of cultural practices have a ‘tacit’ dimension, whose principles are neither obvious to an observer, nor known explicitly by experts. This poses a problem for cultural evolution: if beginners cannot spot the principles to imitate, and experts cannot say what they are doing, how can tacit knowledge pass from generation to generation? We present a domain-general model of ‘tacit teaching’, drawn from statistical physics, that shows how high-accuracy transmission of tacit knowledge is possible. It applies when the practice’s underlying features are subject to interacting and competing constraints. Our model makes predictions for key features of the teaching process. It predicts a tell-tale distribution of teaching outcomes, with some students near-perfect performers while others receiving the same instruction are disastrously bad. This differs from standard cultural evolution models that rely on direct, high-fidelity copying, which lead to a much narrower distribution of mostly mediocre outcomes. The model also predicts generic features of the cultural evolution of tacit knowledge. The evolution of tacit knowledge is expected to be bursty, with long periods of stability interspersed with brief periods of dramatic change, and where tacit knowledge, once lost, becomes essentially impossible to recover.
10 May 2017 in Journal of The Royal Society Interface
In complex environments, there are costs to both ignorance and perception. An organism needs to track fitness-relevant information about its world, but the more information it tracks, the more resources it must devote to perception. As a first step towards a general understanding of this trade-off, we use a tool from information theory, rate–distortion theory, to study large, unstructured environments with fixed, randomly drawn penalties for stimuli confusion (‘distortions’). We identify two distinct regimes for organisms in these environments: a high-fidelity regime where perceptual costs grow linearly with environmental complexity, and a low-fidelity regime where perceptual costs are, remarkably, independent of the number of environmental states. This suggests that in environments of rapidly increasing complexity, well-adapted organisms will find themselves able to make, just barely, the most subtle distinctions in their environment.
Mathematical proofs are both paradigms of certainty and some of the most explicitly-justified arguments that we have in the cultural record. Their very explicitness, however, leads to a paradox, because the probability of error grows exponentially as the argument expands. When a mathematician encounters a proof, how does she come to believe it? Here we show that, under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism combining deductive and abductive reasoning, belief in mathematical arguments can undergo what we call an epistemic phase transition: a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates. To show this, we analyze an unusual dataset of forty-eight machine-aided proofs from the formalized reasoning system Coq, including major theorems ranging from ancient to 21st Century mathematics, along with five hand-constructed cases including Euclid, Apollonius, Hernstein's Topics in Algebra, and Andrew Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics on how we understand proofs, and on a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we justify complex beliefs.
Asking questions is a pervasive human activity, but little is understood about what makes them difficult to answer. An analysis of a pair of large databases, New York Times crosswords and questions from the quiz-show Jeopardy, establishes two orthogonal dimensions of question difficulty: obscurity (the rarity of the answer) and opacity (the indirectness of question cues, operationalized with word2vec). The importance of opacity, and the role of synergistic information in resolving it, suggests that accounts of difficulty in terms of prior expectations captures only a part of the question-asking process. A further regression analysis shows the presence of additional dimensions to question-asking: question complexity, the answer's local network density, cue intersection, and the presence of signal words. Our work shows how question-askers can help their interlocutors by using contextual cues, or, conversely, how a particular kind of unfamiliarity with the domain in question can make it harder for individuals to learn from others. Taken together, these results suggest how Bayesian models of question difficulty can be supplemented by process models and accounts of the heuristics individuals use to navigate conceptual spaces.