Electric power substations, as critical components of modern power grids, are increasingly becoming targets for intentional physical attacks, including vandalism, theft, and sabotage. These threats, coupled with the potential for cyber-attacks and the weaponization of technologies, necessitate robust security measures and comprehensive auditing practices. Despite utilities providers’ focus on understanding grid vulnerability and implementing physical security upgrades, there is a recognized gap in evaluating the effectiveness and long-term usability of these measures. This paper addresses the need for regular security audits to identify vulnerabilities and ensure the overall resilience of substations against evolving threats. The rationale behind this study is to propose a conventional auditing method that includes an auditing framework, checklists, inspections, and post-inspection suggestions. Through the systematic identification and addressing of vulnerabilities via security auditing, the framework aims to significantly enhance the resilience of substations against physical threats. This paper provides a comprehensive guideline for the physical security auditing procedure, which is essential for the reliable operation of the power grid.
Ensuring the physical security of electric power substations is crucial for maintaining a reliable supply of electricity. The increasing prevalence of physical threats, such as physical attacks, vandalism, sabotage, etc., on electric power substations worldwide has resulted in widespread power outages. To enhance physical security in light of these high-impact, low-probability events, this paper proposes a physical security threat assessment approach to evaluate and enhance substation security against physical attacks utilizing the Substation Criticality Index (SCI) and the Threat–Vulnerability–Consequences Index (TVCI) on risk-based security-constrained economic dispatch. The primary objective is to provide power utilities with actionable insights to proactively strengthen their defenses within budgetary constraints by considering the criticality level of each substation. By incorporating social, economic, and electrical factors, this study simulated a physical attack (specifically a bus-isolating attack), on an IEEE 39-bus test system, and evaluated the resultant consequences and load loss. Upon computation of the SCI, substations are ordered according to their criticality, and computing the TVCI gives the risk of each substation which is used to obtain an optimized physical security investment based on substation vulnerability and the consequences of attacks. Thus, based on these results, decisions for prioritizing substation physical security and investments for hardening physical security are made. Furthermore, the experimentation showed that with the physical security investment, the overall TVCI score has significantly decreased with certain budgetary constant.