This study describes the implementation of an energy sector community to examine the practice of cybersecurity for operational technology environments and their supply chains. Evaluating cybersecurity from the perspectives of different actors participating in the energy sector, the progress and challenges of operators and suppliers in delivering cybersecurity for the sector are explored. While regulatory frameworks incentivize individual organizations to improve their cybersecurity, operational services contain contributions from many organizations, and this supply chain of activity needs to be influenced and managed to achieve desired security and resilience outcomes. Through collaborations and systems engineering approaches, a reference model is created to facilitate improvements in managing the cybersecurity of supply chains for different actors, including service operators, maintainers, manufacturers, and systems integrators. This study provides an illustration of implementing a common vision of cybersecurity improvement across a community of actors. It utilizes a collaborative framework that has facilitated the co-production of cybersecurity guidance for energy sector participants.
A recent survey of cybersecurity assessment methods proposed by the scientific community revealed that their practical adoption constitutes a great challenge. Further research that aimed at identifying the reasons for that situation demonstrated that several factors influence the applicability, including the documentation level of detail, the availability of supporting tools, and the continuity of support. This paper presents the European Energy Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (EE-ISAC)—a cybersecurity platform for the energy sector that has been adopted by multiple organisations. The platform facilitates sharing information about cybersecurity incidents, countermeasures, and assessment results. Prospectively, it is envisaged to be integrated with the threat intelligence platform that enables real-time situational awareness. By considering both fault and attack scenarios together, threat awareness can be mapped onto operational contexts to prioritise decisions and responses. This paper analyses EE-ISAC’s approach based on the conceptual applicability framework developed during the research, to improve the applicability and usefulness of this platform for energy sector participants and to identify areas that require further development.
A review by the National Audit Office of the National Cyber Security Programme recommended a more robust performance framework, to understand the impact of the Programme and to focus activities going forward. The Directive on security of network and information systems (the NIS Directive) has placed responsibility for essential aspects of supply chains on Operators of Essential Services (OES). Our dependence on international supply chains also requires a performance framework to assist cybersecurity improvements in this area. The following sections describe work to investigate the implementation of the NIS Directive by Competent Authorities (CA) and OES and proposes a framework to monitor performance across interdependencies. This is to enable development of a more effective set of performance metrics to guide interventions and improvements in cybersecurity for critical infrastructure.
This work describes the collaboration practices of a community of interest in the UK that brings together cybersecurity professionals with a shared interest in improving supply chain cybersecurity for Operational Technology (OT) environments. This research emphasizes the need for collective responsibility between organizations and provides a set of principles for adopting a code of practice and partnership approach to supply chain cybersecurity. This work has enabled cybersecurity experience from several critical infrastructure sectors, including energy, rail, aviation, water, health, and food, to analyze the uptake and practical use of existing supply chain guidance, identifying gaps and challenges. The community has examined touch points with the supply chain and identified improvements related to the communication of cybersecurity requirements, technical and commercial engagement between customers and suppliers, and in the tailoring of implementations towards operational technology contexts. Communicating the context of securing cyber-physical systems is an essential perspective for this community. This work exemplifies a partnership framework and is translating experiences into useful guidance, particularly for OT systems, to improve cybersecurity levels across multiple contributors to critical infrastructure systems.
1 January 2021 in Information & Security: An International Journal