The idea of “resilience” increasingly appears in development dialogue and discussion of food systems. While the academic concept of resilience has roots in diverse disciplines, climate change and the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have led to a rapid intensification of interest in the concept as it applies to food systems. Both the broad conceptual roots and the swift increase in attention pose dangers of conceptual dilution, contradiction, and confusion as agronomists and other analysts of food systems incorporate the resilience concept into their work. In this publicly funded research, the authors present the results of an extensive search of literature and subsequent analysis. The overview examines conceptualizations of resilience more broadly, followed by a similar review within the food systems domain. The authors consider connections among related concepts under the broader umbrella of food security, such as vulnerability and risk, and discuss challenges and opportunities in the investigation of food system resilience. The review of concepts serves as a precursor to an investigation of measurement options in a rapidly expanding body of empirical research, as measurement should flow clearly from conceptualization. The analysis here presents various resilience measures at different levels and breaks down their components as they apply to food systems, identifying commonalities and divergences. The authors identify a glut of resilience conceptualizations and measurements but indicate avenues for consolidation and precision. The range of options means that researchers can likely find suitable existing subconcepts and measurements for their own work across many different types of shocks. The authors also discuss policy and practical applications, including connections to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals and food system responses to climate change and pandemics.
10 February 2022 in Political Science Research and Methods
Exploring if/how lobbying patterns differ by political regime, this paper uses data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys with about 29,000 firms across 83 country/years to test the hypothesis that this political activity should be greater in democracies. Considering a variety of democracy indicators and different lobbying measures, it finds strong support for this expected positive relationship. It then employs these data to consider the trade and currency policy preferences of firms within the special interest channel, comparing democracies with non-democracies. These results show a greater percentage of exporting firms, a lesser percentage of import-competing firms, and a greater percentage of non-tradable firms within the democratic special interest channel, helping to build a lobbying-based explanation for why democracies tend to have more open trade policies and more flexible exchange rate regimes.
This paper seeks to restore labor competition as an explanation for anti-immigration attitudes, recognizing that education may proxy both individual-level skill and cultural socialization. We thus need new tests to distinguish the effect of education based on skill from that due to socialization. If the education effect is consistent with these relationships, then we can have greater confidence that it is capturing the former and not simply the latter. This paper thus develops and conducts a new test, using data from the International Social Survey Program’s National Identity Survey fielded in 2013 across thirty-two countries. From a factoral framework, our test identifies three national-level factors that should influence how much labor market pressure lower skilled citizens feel from immigration: the quantity of immigrants, the direction of capital/investment flows, and the amount of trade protection. These national-level factors are interacted with individual-level education, showing that the attitudinal differences based on education increase with more immigrants but decrease with greater investment inflows and increased trade protection. These results demonstrate why this economic dimension may sometimes be hidden: in national contexts where there are few immigrants, capital follows labor, and/or there is trade protection, labor competition as a driver of anti-immigration preferences should lessen.
Political economists have paid increasing attention to distinctions between exporting and nonexporting firms, particularly with regard to their preferences on trade policy liberalization. A multitude of past studies focusing on economically advanced democracies characterized exporters as a small, elite group of large and highly productive firms, but this profile of a prototypical exporter is not necessarily representative of the body of firms operating under different domestic contexts. Using current and methodologically consistent cross-national surveys of firms conducted by the World Bank, this paper re-evaluates the link between certain firm-level characteristics and firms’ propensity to export, taking into account how national-level political, economic, and geographic conditions affect these relationships. The pooled sample of firms from approximately 100 countries spanning different political regimes and levels of development confirms that, generally speaking, exporters are large, productive, and innovative. However, in less democratic and less developed settings, productivity and innovation do not appear to be a prerequisite to export orientation. When developing generalizable theories of firms’ participation in the policymaking process, we must therefore be careful not to treat export behavior as an unqualified predictor of pro-free-trade attitudes.