Anomaly-based Web application firewalls (WAFs) are vital for providing early reactions to novel Web attacks. In recent years, various machine learning, deep learning, and transfer learning-based anomaly detection approaches have been developed to protect against Web attacks. Most of them directly treat the request URL as a general string that consists of letters and roughly use natural language processing (NLP) methods (i.e., Word2Vec and Doc2Vec) or domain knowledge to extract features. In this paper, we proposed an improved feature extraction approach which leveraged the advantage of the semantic structure of URLs. Semantic structure is an inherent interpretative property of the URL that identifies the function and vulnerability of each part in the URL. The evaluations on CSIC-2020 show that our feature extraction method has better performance than conventional feature extraction routine by more than average dramatic 5% improvement in accuracy, recall, and F1-score.
1 April 2023 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Voice over LTE (VoLTE) and Voice over NR (VoNR), are two similar technologies that have been widely deployed by operators to provide a better calling experience in LTE and 5G networks, respectively. The VoLTE/NR protocols rely on the security features of the underlying LTE/5G network to protect users' privacy such that nobody can monitor calls and learn details about call times, duration, and direction. In this paper, we introduce a new privacy attack which enables adversaries to analyse encrypted LTE/5G traffic and recover any VoLTE/NR call details. We achieve this by implementing a novel mobile-relay adversary which is able to remain undetected by using an improved physical layer parameter guessing procedure. This adversary facilitates the recovery of encrypted configuration messages exchanged between victim devices and the mobile network. We further propose an identity mapping method which enables our mobile-relay adversary to link a victim's network identifiers to the phone number efficiently, requiring a single VoLTE protocol message. We evaluate the real-world performance of our attacks using four modern commercial off-the-shelf phones and two representative, commercial network carriers. We collect over 60 hours of traffic between the phones and the mobile networks and execute 160 VoLTE calls, which we use to successfully identify patterns in the physical layer parameter allocation and in VoLTE traffic, respectively. Our real-world experiments show that our mobile-relay works as expected in all test cases, and the VoLTE activity logs recovered describe the actual communication with 100% accuracy. Finally, we show that we can link network identifiers such as International Mobile Subscriber Identities (IMSI), Subscriber Concealed Identifiers (SUCI) and/or Globally Unique Temporary Identifiers (GUTI) to phone numbers while remaining undetected by the victim.
8 June 2022 in Security and Communication Networks
Secure data publishing of private trajectory is a typical application scene in the Internet of Things (IoT). Protecting users’ privacy while publishing data has always been a long-term challenge. In recent years, the mainstream method is to combine the Markov model and differential privacy (DP) mechanism to build a private trajectory generation model and publishes the generated synthetic trajectory data instead of the original data. However, Markov cannot effectively model the long-term trajectory data spatio-temporal correlation, and the DP noise results in the low availability of the synthetic data. To protect users’ privacy and improve the availability of synthetic trajectory data, we propose a trajectory generation model with differential privacy and deep learning (DTG). In DTG, we design a private hierarchical adaptive grid method. It divides the geospatial region into several subregions according to the density of positions to realize the discretization of coordinates of the trajectory data. Second, GRU is used to capture the temporal features of the trajectory sequence for good availability, and we generate synthetic trajectory data by predicting the next position. Third, we adopt the optimizer perturbation method in gradient descent to protect the privacy of model parameters. Finally, we experimentally compare DTG with the state-of-the-art approaches in trajectory generation on actual trajectory data T-Drive, Portotaxi, and Swedishtaxi. The result demonstrates that DTG has a better performance in generating synthetic trajectories under four error metrics.
Anomaly detection has been proven to be an efficient way to detect malicious behaviour and cyberattacks in industrial cyber–physical systems (ICPSs). However, most detection models are not entirely adapted to the real world as they require intensive computational resources and labelled data and lack interpretability. This study investigated the traffic behaviour of a real coal mine system and proposed improved features to describe its operation pattern. Based on these features, this work combined the basic deterministic finite automaton (DFA) and normal distribution (ND) models to build an unsupervised anomaly detection model, which uses a hierarchical structure to pursue interpretability. To demonstrate its capability, this model was evaluated on real traffic and seven simulated attack types and further compared with nine state-of-the-art works. The evaluation and comparison results show that the proposed method achieved a 99% F1-score and is efficient in detecting sophisticated attacks. Furthermore, it achieved an average 17% increase in precision and a 12% increase in F1-Score compared to previous works. These results confirm the advantages of the proposed method. The work further suggests that future works should investigate operation pattern features rather than pursuing complex algorithms.
Voice over LTE (VoLTE) and Voice over NR (VoNR) are two similar technologies that have been widely deployed by operators to provide a better calling experience in LTE and 5G networks, respectively. The VoLTE/NR protocols rely on the security features of the underlying LTE/5G network to protect users' privacy such that nobody can monitor calls and learn details about call times, duration, and direction. In this paper, we introduce a new privacy attack which enables adversaries to analyse encrypted LTE/5G traffic and recover any VoLTE/NR call details. We achieve this by implementing a novel mobile-relay adversary which is able to remain undetected by using an improved physical layer parameter guessing procedure. This adversary facilitates the recovery of encrypted configuration messages exchanged between victim devices and the mobile network. We further propose an identity mapping method which enables our mobile-relay adversary to link a victim's network identifiers to the phone number efficiently, requiring a single VoLTE protocol message. We evaluate the real-world performance of our attacks using four modern commercial off-the-shelf phones and two representative, commercial network carriers. We collect over 60 hours of traffic between the phones and the mobile networks and execute 160 VoLTE calls, which we use to successfully identify patterns in the physical layer parameter allocation and in VoLTE traffic, respectively. Our real-world experiments show that our mobile-relay works as expected in all test cases, and the VoLTE activity logs recovered describe the actual communication with 100% accuracy. Finally, we show that we can link network identifiers such as International Mobile Subscriber Identities (IMSI), Subscriber Concealed Identifiers (SUCI) and/or Globally Unique Temporary Identifiers (GUTI) to phone numbers while remaining undetected by the victim.