Various forms of empirical evidence suggest that parental socioeconomic status (SES) is strongly related to educational outcomes and many countries attempt to close achievement gaps among children. Parenting practice is one important mechanism through which educational inequality emerges across families with different SES. In this paper, we show that the class gap in children’s time use and academic achievements reflects parenting styles and parental practices stratified by parental SES by comparatively investigating the cases of China, Japan, and the USA, drawing on three sets of nationally representative longitudinal data. We find that for children aged 10–15 in China, parental SES has a strong impact on children's homework time and academic performance. Similar patterns are found in the results of 10–15-year-old children in Japan; however, homework time more weakly relates to the parents' education level. Moreover, restricting the samples to 14-year-old children and comparing the three countries, we find that the test score gap among parental SES is the largest in the USA; to fill the gap in math test scores between the first and fourth income quartiles, a sizable number of additional hours spent on homework are needed in the USA, compared to China and Japan.

This paper investigates a new voting rule wherein some people are given extra votes to serve as proxies for future generations. We predict that this voting scheme affects the voting behavior of those who do not receive an extra vote (i.e., single-ballot voters) because they are less likely to become a pivot, while proxy voters are expected to behave in support of the future generation. To test this prediction, we compare three scenarios wherein single-ballot voters would cast a vote: (a) one-voter-one-vote scenario wherein all voters cast only a single ballot; (b) a standard proxy-voting scenario wherein other voters cast two ballots, and the second vote is to cast for the benefit of a future generation; and (c) a non-proxy-voting scenario wherein other voters cast two ballots with no explanation for the second vote. The result shows that single-ballot voters are less inclined to vote for the future-oriented option in (c) than in (a). This indicates the potential drawback of the new voting scheme. However, there is no difference in the single-ballot voters’ decision between (a) and (b), indicating that the explanation of the second ballot as the proxy is important for reducing the intergenerational inequality through this voting reform.

The purpose of this study was to determine whether attitudes toward risk and altruism are affected by being in a group or being alone. In contrast to previous economic research on group decision-making, we excluded the effects of group informal discussions, which are thought to be a “black box” when individuals make decisions in a group. In this regard, the subjects in our experiment were only requested to show their faces to the other members, without further communication. Moreover, we adopted two collective decision rules, i.e., the median rule and the random rule, which provide the truth-telling mechanism. In the experiments of both anonymous investment and donation, we found that the subjects who made decisions in a group offered significantly lower amounts than those who made decisions alone, after controlling for individuals’ risk and altruistic preferences. The findings imply that people are more risk-averse and self-interested when they are in a group, regardless of which collective decision rules are adopted.

It is commonly-believed that education is a good thing for individuals. Yet its correlation with subjective well-being is most often only weakly positive, or even negative, despite the many associated better individual-level outcomes We here square the circle using novel Japanese data on happiness aspirations. If reported happiness comes from a comparison of outcomes to aspirations, then any phenomenon raising both at the same time will have only a muted effect on reported well-being. We find that around half of the happiness effect of education is cancelled out by higher aspirations, and suggest a similar dampening effect for income.