Theories of object recognition differ to the extent that they consider object representations as being mediated only by the shape of the object, or shape and surface details, if surface details are part of the representation. In particular, it has been suggested that color information may be helpful at recognizing objects only in very special cases, but not during basic-level object recognition in good viewing conditions. In this study, we collected normative data (naming agreement, familiarity, complexity, and imagery judgments) for Snodgrass and Vanderwart's object database of 260 black-and-white line drawings, and then compared the data to exactly the same shapes but with added gray-level texture and surface details (set 2), and color (set 3). Naming latencies were also recorded. Whereas the addition of texture and shading without color only slightly improved naming agreement scores for the objects, the addition of color information unambiguously improved naming accuracy and speeded correct response times. As shown in previous studies, the advantage provided by color was larger for objects with a diagnostic color, and structurally similar shapes, such as fruits and vegetables, but was also observed for man-made objects with and without a single diagnostic color. These observations show that basic-level ‘everyday’ object recognition in normal conditions is facilitated by the presence of color information, and support a ‘shape + surface’ model of object recognition, for which color is an integral part of the object representation. In addition, the new stimuli (sets 2 and 3) and the corresponding normative data provide valuable materials for a wide range of experimental and clinical studies of object recognition.

Neuroimaging studies have identified at least two bilateral areas of the visual extrastriate cortex that respond more to pictures of faces than objects in normal human subjects in the middle fusiform gyrus [the ‘fusiform face area’ (FFA)] and, more posteriorly, in the inferior occipital cortex [‘occipital face area’ (OFA)], with a right hemisphere dominance. However, it is not yet clear how these regions interact which each other and whether they are all necessary for normal face perception. It has been proposed that the right hemisphere FFA acts as an isolated (‘modular’) processing system for faces or that this region receives its face‐sensitive inputs from the OFA in a feedforward hierarchical model of face processing. To test these proposals, we report a detailed neuropsychological investigation combined with a neuroimaging study of a patient presenting a deficit restricted to face perception, consecutive to bilateral occipito‐temporal lesions. Due to the asymmetry of the lesions, the left middle fusiform gyrus and the right inferior occipital cortex were damaged but the right middle fusiform gyrus was structurally intact. Using functional MRI, we disclosed a normal activation of the right FFA in response to faces in the patient despite the absence of any feedforward inputs from the right OFA, located in a damaged area of cortex. Together, these findings show that the integrity of the right OFA is necessary for normal face perception and suggest that the face‐sensitive responses observed at this level in normal subjects may arise from feedback connections from the right FFA. In agreement with the current literature on the anatomical basis of prosopagnosia, it is suggested that the FFA and OFA in the right hemisphere and their re‐entrant integration are necessary for normal face processing.

Behavioral studies have shown that picture-plane inversion impacts face and object recognition differently, thereby suggesting face-specific processing mechanisms in the human brain. Here we used event-related potentials to investigate the time course of this behavioral inversion effect in both faces and novel objects. ERPs were recorded for 14 subjects presented with upright and inverted visual categories, including human faces and novel objects (Greebles). A N170 was obtained for all categories of stimuli, including Greebles. However, only inverted faces delayed and enhanced N170 (bilaterally). These observations indicate that the N170 is not specific to faces, as has been previously claimed. In addition, the amplitude difference between faces and objects does not reflect face-specific mechanisms since it can be smaller than between non-face object categories. There do exist some early differences in the time-course of categorization for faces and non-faces across inversion. This may be attributed either to stimulus category per se (e.g. face-specific mechanisms) or to differences in the level of expertise between these categories.