Construction projects are associated with risks, which influence projects’ performance and quality. To ensure the on-time completion of construction projects, project managers often use risk assessment and management methods to reduce risks in the project life cycle. Identifying risk factors and the relationship between major risk factors and the quality of construction projects facilitates construction management. In this study, 948 project records of construction inspection from 1993 to 2020 were collected from the Public Construction Management Information System (PCMIS) of the Taiwan central government to conduct an expert survey to identify five risk dimensions and 19 major risk factors associated with Taiwanese construction projects. The hybrid analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and an artificial neural network (ANN) were employed to develop a model for predicting major risk factors and construction quality. The AHP was used to calculate the weight of major risk factors to verify their influence on construction. The ANN was adopted to extract the features of major risk factors to predict the quality of a construction project. The accuracy of the prediction model was 85%. The project managers can reference the prediction results obtained with the proposed method to perform effective risk management and devise decision-making strategies for construction management.
Change orders have received considerable attention from researchers thus far, but none have considered pricing strategies of change orders through the interaction between general contractors and subcontractors. Previous studies found that contractors’ opportunistic bidding considering beyond-contractual reward (BCR) in the execution stage can be reduced by improving the construction management system and strengthening the supervision of contractors’ performance. However, the BCR remains in ecology of construction engineering. This study proposes an integrated evolutionary game theory-system dynamics model (ET-SD model) and simulates the pricing strategy of change orders between general contractors and subcontractors to explore the root cause of BCR phenomenon. Sensitivity analysis on the evolutionary dynamics of payoff is explored. Results reveal that change orders with BCR maintain Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) unless changing the payoff structure between general and subcontractors’ pricing strategies. This study presents important managerial insights from the evolutionary game perspectives, nature of change orders, and payoff of the alternative.