Ecological compensation is an effective means to solve the conflict of interests among trans-boundary river basin countries. How to determine the ecological compensation standard is the core of ecological compensation. On the basis of the emergy synthesis method, we developed an emergy-water resources ecological footprint model for trans-boundary river basin countries. Based on the calculation of ecosystem service value and consumption ecological value of trans-boundary river basin countries, the ecological spillover value of each basin country is obtained. From the perspective of supply and consumption, the ecological compensation standard in basin countries is determined by judging the supply and consumption status of ecological services and combining with the willingness to pay for ecological compensation. Taking the Lancang–Mekong River Basin as an example, the results show that (1) the ecosystem service value of the Lancang–Mekong River Basin countries from high to low is Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, China, Vietnam, and Myanmar; (2) in terms of ecosystem service value consumption, the order from high to low is Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, China, Laos, and Myanmar; and (3) Thailand and Vietnam, located in the lower reaches of the basin, belong to the consumers of ecological services, and based on the actual willingness to pay, they need to pay $46.913 billion and $1.699 billion, respectively.

The issue of trans-boundary water conflict has become an important factor affecting the relations between basin countries. The key to solve the current conflict problem is to realize the fair and reasonable allocation of trans-boundary water resources. Based on the satisfaction perspective, we developed an asymmetric Nash negotiation model to obtain an optimal and feasible allocation scheme for the trans-boundary water resources. Firstly, based on the two international water laws, we analyzed the influencing factors including water demand differences, resource endowment differences, and water efficiency differences, and by combing with the flexible weight constraint, we built the fair and reasonable allocation pattern for trans-boundary water resources. Secondly, under the constraint of the allocation pattern, we determined the ideal negotiation scheme of each basin country by considering their selection preference. Thirdly, we built a satisfaction degree function and established an asymmetric Nash negotiation model. This is used to build a fair negotiation mechanism among basin countries, and the allocation scheme after negotiation is regarded as the optimal allocation scheme. Lastly, we took the Lancang–Mekong river basin as an example. For this example, the results indicate the following: (1) after considering multiple factors comprehensively, China and Thailand obtained a higher proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota under different preference scenarios, while Myanmar obtained a lower proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota; (2) taking each basin country as the negotiation agent, the optimal allocation scheme with the introduction of fair negotiation mechanism has a higher degree of satisfaction, with an average of over 87.19%, which is more stable and easy to be accepted by all basin countries; (3) from the perspective of the change rate and the average satisfaction of the basin countries, the optimal allocation scheme under the resource endowment preference scenario obtained the highest satisfaction among basin countries. This study aims to improve the practicability and acceptability of trans-boundary water resources allocation, thus providing technical support for reducing trans-boundary water resources conflicts.

Water stress in countries within a drainage basin exacerbates the water quantity conflict in transboundary rivers. However, few studies considered the invisible effect of virtual water transfer on water quantity conflict by intensifying water stress. Therefore, this study, with Ili River as the case, collects data on Virtual Water Trade (VWT) from 1990 to 2015, uses water stress index (WSI) to assess water stress values under two scenarios (with or without virtual water transfer), and takes Grey Verhulst Model to predict two scenarios water stress values respectively. Next, based on the Levenberg—Marquardt (LM) Algorithm, this study compares the water quantity conflict intensity of the two scenarios, and further explores the invisible effect of virtual water transfer on the conflicts among transboundary rivers. Results show: (1) During the study period (1990–2015), water stress in China and Kazakhstan along the banks of Ili River increased in general. (2) China was basically a net exporter of virtual water during 1990–1995, and Kazakhstan became a net exporter after 1995. (3) During 2020–2025, water conflict value of Ili River without virtual water transfer is 0.458, while the value rises to 0.622 with virtual water transfer, indicating that virtual water transfer between China and Kazakhstan has an invisible enhancement on the water quantity conflict of Ili River. (4) The intensified water quantity conflict is mainly caused by the more and more serious water stress in Kazakhstan. On such basis, it is more urgent for Kazakhstan to restructure its economy and trade.

The ecological compensation standard in transboundary river basins should be determined by the basin countries through negotiation on the basis of the base value of the ecological compensation standard. This paper calculated the base value range of the ecological compensation standard, determining the upper limit based on the spillover value of ecosystem services for the ecosystem-service-consuming country and the lower limit according to the cost of ecological protection for the ecosystem-service-supplying country. The final range was determined by integrating this with the willingness to pay and the actual effort in each basin country. Taking, for example, the Lancang–Mekong River basin, the results indicate that the spillover value of ecosystem services in Laos, China and Myanmar was positive and these three countries were ecosystem-service-supplying countries, while in Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand it was negative and these three countries were ecosystem-service-consuming countries. Among the ecosystem-service-supplying countries, the cost of ecological protection of them was in descending order of Laos, China and Myanmar, which was related to their own level of economic development. Considering the adjustment coefficient for the payment of ecosystem service value and the cost-sharing coefficient of each basin country, the feasible range for the base value of the ecological compensation standard was determined to be [2.47, 229.67] × 10⁸ $, which provided the basis for the negotiation on the determination of the ECS. In addition, implementation suggestions were proposed from three aspects: establishing a basin-information-sharing mechanism and platform, establishing an integrated management organization for transboundary river basins, and strengthening and improving the coordination and supervision model of ecological compensation.

Tradable water volumes is one of the basic elements of water-rights trading. In China, water-rights transactions mostly occur in water-deficient areas. However, the water-rich areas are also facing serious water-shortage problems. It is necessary to stimulate the water-rights trading power in abundant water areas to improve water-resource predicament. This paper studied the concept and calculation method of tradable water volumes of industry. First, based on the property rights theory, we analyzed the concept of tradable water volumes, and put forward the preliminary determination of water-rights trading subjects. Then, we defined the tradable water volumes of industry as the difference between the initial water-rights allocation and the water demand of industry. We used the proportion method to calculate the initial water-rights allocation of industry under different runoff frequencies, and grey model (1,1) to predict the water demand of industry. Finally, we applied the calculation method to Changsha city which is in a water-rich area of China. The calculation results contribute to water-resource management in Changsha city. This paper will provide a theoretical basis for researching the tradable water volumes, and promote the development of water-rights trading in China’s water-rich areas.