The farmland shelterbelt is an important artificial ecological project for improving farmland microclimates, ensuring agricultural production, and promoting sustainable development in China’s ecologically fragile areas. Due to the quasi-public attribute, farmland shelterbelts were mainly constructed and managed by the government in the past. In recent years, the reform of the separation of three rights in collective forestland and the mechanism of “private supply of public goods” have prompted farmers to participate in the modern forest management system. However, there is a lack of consistency between farmers’ management intentions and actual contract operation and management behaviors, resulting in weakened management and protection in many places, which seriously restricts the construction efficiency of farmland shelterbelts. Therefore, based on the survey data and planning behavior theory (TPB) of 1106 farmers in 16 major agricultural production areas (counties) in Xinjiang, this study aims to explore the key factors affecting farmers ‘forestry management and production decision making and to verify the transformation mechanism of farmers’ behavior through path analysis. The results show that the management decisions of farmers in ecologically fragile areas follow the path form of “cognitive → intention → behavior”, in which the multi-dimensional cognition of farmers has a significant impact on farmers’ behavioral intention, while the effect on behavioral response is relatively small, which currently depends on the promotion of ecological compensation and government behavior. Finally, this study puts forward countermeasures and suggestions for continuously stimulating the farmers’ forest operation behavior and provides policy reference for promoting the sustainable development of farmland shelterbelts in ecologically fragile areas put forward countermeasures and suggestions for continuously stimulating farmers’ forestry behavior.

Pest and disease control outsourcing has become an effective means to restore damaged arable land and guarantee agroecological benefits. However, it is adopted at a relatively low rate in China. The purpose of this study is to explore, from the perspective of government intervention, behavioral logic, and the game relationship among farmers, service organizations and the government in the pest and disease control outsourcing system as well as the endogenous motivation of each subject. The results indicate that when the degree of policy implementation is low, the government’s policy is ineffective, but, after reaching a certain level, the higher the degree of policy implementation is, the stronger the farmers’ willingness to choose outsourcing control and the service organizations’ willingness to provide positive control services are, and the faster the stable state of tripartite joint pest and disease control is formed. In the case of implementing a single policy tool, the convergence rate of each party that implements the regulatory policy alone is fast but may be unstable, while the rate is slow but more stable when a guidance- or incentive-based policy is solely applied. The effect of a combination of policy tools being applied is much better than that of a single policy tool being applied. The simultaneous implementation of the three types of policy tools can form a policy system with both positive and negative mechanisms, which can maximize the complementary and superposition effects.

The purpose of this study is to explore, from the perspective of government interven-tion, behavioral logic and game relationship among farmers, service organizations and the gov-ernment in the pest and disease control outsourcing system, as well as the endogenous motiva-tion of each subject. The results indicate that the stronger the willingness of each subject, the faster the stable state of joint pest and disease control among the three parties can be formed; In the case of implementing a single policy tool, the convergence rate of each party that imple-ments the regulatory policy alone is fast but may be unstable, while the rate is slow but more stable when a guidance- or incentive-based policy is solely applied; The effect of policy tool combination is much better than that of a single policy tool applied. The simultaneous imple-mentation of the three types of policy tools can form a policy system with both positive and negative mechanisms, which can maximize complementary and superposition effect.