Incorporating sustainability into the supply chain is becoming a key priority for many textile and apparel companies. For example, H&M, Patagonia, and The North Face have incorporated various approaches to enhance their levels of sustainable supply chain management. Typical approaches include sustainable product strategy, sustainable investment, sustainable performance evaluation, corporate social responsibility, and environmental management system adoption, which contribute to the development of sustainable supply chain management in the textile and apparel industry. In this paper, we introduce the fifteen articles published in this special issue, and summarize the key findings and future research directions in the area of textile and apparel sustainable supply chain management.

The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) threatens people’s health. During the COVID-19 outbreak, people are encouraged to wear masks to reduce the spread of the virus. With the strong demand for masks, it has come a boom in counterfeit production. Combating counterfeit masks is vital and urgent to reduce the risks for public health. Motivated by the actual practices during the COVID-19, we examine how quality inspection and blockchain adoption help combat counterfeit masks. We find that quality inspection may not be always effective, as the government will tolerate the presence of counterfeit masks if the presence of the counterfeits is not significant. Comparing quality inspection with blockchain adoption, when the spread of COVID-19 is mild, authentic mask sellers may be encouraged to use the blockchain technology, which can increase their profits and reduce the social health risk. Furthermore, we extend our model to investigate the impacts of endogenous quality. Both quality inspection and blockchain adoption can induce low-quality mask sellers to enhance thequality level. When the number of counterfeit masks is increasing, encouraging the high-quality mask sellers to adopt the blockchain technology is effective to reduce social health risk when the spread of the coronavirus is rapid.

Sustainability is a prevalent topic as the consumers and the governments are much more concerned about the environmental pollution. To reduce the carbon emission, in real world practice, governments have executed different forms of policies to motivate the firms to operate in a sustainable manner. This paper aims to examine the value of bargaining contract when the supply chain member invests in the sustainability projects, and explore the effectiveness of the direct (e.g., cash grant) and indirect (e.g., an increased environmental tax rate) subsidies in reducing the total carbon emission. We first derive the optimal pricing and sustainability effort under the wholesale pricing contract when either the manufacturer or the retailer makes the sustainability investment. We then consider the supply chain coordination under the two-part tariff, revenue sharing, and bargaining contracts. We uncover that only the bargaining contract can coordinate the supply chain and a Pareto improvement is achieved when the bargaining power of the manufacturer is in a specific range. Finally, we reveal that both the direct and indirect subsidies can increase the sustainability effort but they are not always an effective tool to reduce the total carbon emissions.

Fashion supply chain members now search for trade-offs between sustainable investment and the related incentives, such as savings on environmental taxes and gains in incremental demands. To evaluate the economic and environmental performance of sustainable investment from a power perspective, we develop an analytical model to study a two-echelon sustainable supply chain consisting of one retailer and one manufacturer with three different power structures. We derive the optimal solutions for various cases associated with different supply chain power structures and sustainable investors. Though it is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer to make sustainable investment, they often utilize high power to gain economic benefit with less sustainable investment. Interestingly, the follower with less supply chain power has more incentive to make a sustainable effort to achieve a higher profit. The optimal amount of sustainable investment in the apparel manufacturer investment case is greater than that in the retailer investment case in most scenarios.