Riccardo Vecellio Segate

Dr. Riccardo Vecellio Segate

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 November 2023 in European Journal of Risk Regulation
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Journal Article
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RSRiccardo Vecellio Segate
Riccardo Vecellio Segate
ADAngela Daly
Angela Daly
Until robots and humans mostly worked in fast-paced and yet separate environments, occupational health and safety (OHS) rules could address workers’ safety largely independently from robotic conduct. This is no longer the case: collaborative robots (cobots) working alongside humans warrant the design of policies ensuring the safety of both humans and robots at once, within shared spaces and upon delivery of cooperative workflows. Within the European Union (EU), the applicable regulatory framework stands at the intersection between international industry standards and legislation at the EU as well as Member State level. Not only do current standards and laws fail to satisfactorily attend to the physical and mental health challenges prompted by human–robot interaction (HRI), but they exhibit important gaps in relation to smart cobots (“SmaCobs”) more specifically. In fact, SmaCobs combine the black-box unforeseeability afforded by machine learning with more general HRI-associated risks, towards increasingly complex, mobile and interconnected operational interfaces and production chains. Against this backdrop, based on productivity and health motivations, we urge the encoding of the enforcement of OHS policies directly into SmaCobs. First, SmaCobs could harness the sophistication of quantum computing to adapt a tangled normative architecture in a responsive manner to the contingent needs of each situation. Second, entrusting them with OHS enforcement vis-à-vis both themselves and humans may paradoxically prove safer as well as more cost-effective than for humans to do so. This scenario raises profound legal, ethical and somewhat philosophical concerns around SmaCobs’ legal personality, the apportionment of liability and algorithmic explainability. The first systematic proposal to tackle such questions is henceforth formulated. For the EU, we propose that this is achieved through a new binding OHS Regulation aimed at the SmaCobs age.

10 July 2020 in Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice
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Journal Article
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RSRiccardo Vecellio Segate
Riccardo Vecellio Segate
The globalization of supply chains and digitization of corporate processes have resulted in both advantages and disadvantages for trade secrets management. Most trade secrets today are stored in digital environments, readily transferable through the cyberspace, and accessed remotely (including possibly overseas) by the relevant employees; very few of these secrets, related to the most traditional branches of industries that find it difficult to dematerialize, originate physically or are not subsequently digitized in order to be stored, transferred and/or protected. Such protection, though, is only relatively safe. The negative side of mentioned trends is that when trade secrets are located in the cyberspace—for example, in Internet-connected devices, or in the so-called ‘cloud’, or even in corporate intranets—they can also be accessed and sometimes misappropriated by unauthorized individuals or entities (mostly external to the company) from literally anywhere in the world. It is no surprise that trade secrets misappropriations occur mostly this way, to an extent which is unprecedented and forced this issue on the policymakers’ agenda, both domestically across several jurisdictions and globally via relevant international organizations. Indeed, not only does the economic value of the misappropriated secrets seem to increase dramatically year by year, but the nature of these crimes is changing too: if up to a couple of decades ago most unauthorized accesses to (and thefts of) trade secrets were performed physically by insiders and thus, obviously, fell within the reach of a specific jurisdiction, today companies and policymakers are confronted with thefts which extend on a transnational scale, originating all new problems in terms of inter alia prosecution, enforcement (eg of preliminary injunctions), recovery, evidence gathering and preservation, and award of damages. ‘Trade secret laws exist to provide companies with a way of protecting their private knowledge from theft. However, industrial espionage predates the security concern over hackers using computers to steal IP.’ 1 Provided that certain companies and secrets are strategic for states themselves, different countries have been trying to respond to these challenges by updating their legislation or introducing new trade secrets-specific provisions, so that cyber-enabled misappropriation could face serious legal consequences domestically and even, when applicable, on the international plane.


8 July 2024 in International Journal of Digital Law and Governance
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Journal Article
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RSRiccardo Vecellio Segate
Riccardo Vecellio Segate
All throughout the so-called “Global South”, hundreds of millions of individuals from entire communities in the rural, poorer, or most peripheral areas are not officially recorded by the States they are citizens of or they habitually reside in. This is why several of such States are resorting to extensive and purportedly “universal” digital remote onboarding programs, pioneered by India’s Aadhaar, whereby individuals are centrally recorded onto a public database with their identity (and possibly citizenship) confirmed. Whenever paper documents are obsolete, inaccurate, deteriorated, or inexistent, individuals may have their identity confirmed through an “introducer”, who mediates between marginalised communities and central authorities and is entrusted by both with this delicate task. Introducers, however, cannot by themselves grant someone the status as “citizen”: they may at best confirm his or her existence and identity. These onboarding programs are enabled by wide-covering sets of technical standards, ranging from data protection and cybersecurity to interoperability, safety, disaster recovery, and business continuity. Meanwhile, similar technologies, relying on analogous standards, and fundamentally aimed at a similar purpose (that is, registering all those who fall within the prescriptive jurisdiction of a State), are deployed by border officials in the context of migration management – especially in “developed” countries. The “unofficial” and “outside-the-scope-of-the-law” components of said migratory patterns are growing exponentially due to combined effects of climate, insecurity, and geopolitical factors, increasingly originating “borderline” situations whereby identity and citizenship are challenged and contested: statelessness, refuge, nomadism (both traditional and “digital”), and internal displacement. Strikingly enough, discussions around what technical standards to adopt, and who should select them, as well as on what the role of “introducers” could be, towards the digital onboarding of individuals experiencing “borderline” configurations of citizenship are entirely neglected in socio-legal and security scholarship alike. Complemented with concrete policy proposals, the present work accepts the ambition to start bridging this gap.

2 January 2022 in Nordic Journal of Human Rights
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Journal Article
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RSRiccardo Vecellio Segate
Riccardo Vecellio Segate
As this Anniversary Issue concerns itself with the ‘future of human rights’, some thought is probably due on what ‘human rights’ truly do or should evoke – this is not to say that we know anything ...