Purpose—The study on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality is not new. However, the results are inconsistent and mixed, and to some degree, even contradictory, which represents a gap in the literature. The purpose of this study is to provide some explanations for these mixed results in the literature by investigating the effect of corporate governance mechanisms, as a moderator variable (which has not been considered in the literature before), on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality based on the Dechow and Dichev model and the modified Jones model. Design/methodology/approach—The statistical model used in this study is a multivariate regression model; furthermore, the statistical technique used to test the hypotheses is panel data. Findings—The findings reveal that the adopted models (Dechow and Dichev) and the corporate governance mechanisms (such as board independence, large shareholders, and institutional ownership) can have a moderating effect on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality. These findings are exciting, contribute to the current literature, and explain some of the reasons for mixed results. Practical implications—The findings of the current study provide an important guideline for firms to consider the impact of adopted models (Dechow and Dichev), as well as the corporate governance mechanisms (such as board independence, large shareholders, and institutional ownership) on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality. Originality/value—Examining the impact of Dechow and Dichev models as well as the corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality is new in this paper. It can explain part of the reasons for the mixed and inconsistent results in the literature.

Past studies have investigated the relationship between audit committee features and earnings management and reported mixed and inconclusive results. Some studies have found a significant relationship, while others have not. This study aims to explain these mixed results in the literature by dividing earning management into two groups: accrual and real earnings management (at three levels of sales, general and administrative costs, production costs and cash flows operation) and re-examining the relationship. The statistical model used in this study is a multivariate regression model; further, the statistical technique used to test the hypotheses is panel data. The findings show that both the audit committee members' financial expertise and the audit committee's size affect the accrual earnings management. However, the results show no meaningful relationship between the audit committee features and real-based earnings management at any levels of sales, general and administrative costs, production costs and cash flow operation. In addition, the findings suggest no meaningful relationship between the independence of the audit committee's members and accrual earnings management. In other words, not separating the earning management into ‘accrual’ and ‘real’ could be the critical factor for the reported mixed and inconsistent results in the literature. The findings of the current study provide an important guideline for investors and stakeholders to separate ‘accrual’ from ‘real’ earning management and pay more attention to the importance of audit committee features to limit the opportunities of earnings management. Indeed, by understanding the relationship between audit committee features and earnings management, investors and stockholders can make appropriate decisions regarding the optimal choice of funds. Dividing the earning management into two groups (accrual versus real) and re-examining its relationship with the audit committee features is new in this paper. Identifying one of the possible reasons for the past mixed and inconsistent results in the literature is also an incremental contribution provided by this study.

This study investigates the interactive effect of ownership structure on the relationship between annual board report readability and stock price crash risk in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). The negative skewness model was used to measure the crash risk of stock prices and the Fog index was used for determining the readability of the board of directors’ report. The ownership structure is examined in institutional ownership, significant managerial ownership, and family ownership. The data of companies listed on the TSE from 2013 to 2019 have been used. The statistical method of this research is multiple regressions and, to test the research hypotheses, the data panel model and the ordinary least squares method have been employed. Overall, this study provides new evidence to explain the reporting quality and the crash risk of stock prices from the lenses of the agency theory. It further investigates the interactive effect of ownership structure on the relationship between annual board report readability and stock price crash risk. The results show a significant correlation between the readability of the board of directors’ report and the crash risk of stock prices. Furthermore, the relationship between the readability of the board report and stock price crash risk is not affected by the ownership structure, including institutional ownership, significant managerial ownership, and family ownership. It can be inferred that an ownership structure, which includes institutional shareholders, significant shareholders, and family ownership, increases the supervision of managers and their reports, so they cannot keep adverse information from being released. This will ultimately improve the readability of their reports and reduce the risk of stock price crashes.

The primary goal of this study was to investigate the effects of changes in corporate governance elements on a company’s valuable resources (such as intellectual capital and its components). Previous studies have examined the impacts of some corporate governance characteristics on intellectual capital performance as a whole and they have produced inconclusive and different results. This paper examines the effects of some corporate governance characteristics (i.e., the change in CEO, the evolution of auditor, the change in board independence, and the change in institutional ownership) on intellectual capital and its components (i.e., capital employed, human capital, and structural capital). This research is based on a quantitative study and the selected sample contains 1170 observations from 220 companies listed on the Middle East Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2018. The research findings show a positive and significant relationship between an increase in institutional ownership and intellectual capital and its two components (human capital and structural capital). The results support the relationship between a change in auditor and intellectual capital and human capital efficiency. Further, a positive and significant association was found between an increase in board independence and human capital. However, no relationship was found between a change of CEO and intellectual capital or any of its components. This study extends the research field of corporate governance by studying the effects of changes in corporate governance characteristics on intellectual capital for the first time. Given the significant role of intellectual capital in the performance of firms, this study provides essential information to organisations’ decision makers.

The present research investigates the relationship between managers’ disclosure tone and the trading volume of small and large investors separately. The inconsistency of disclosure tone and abnormal trading volume generally indicates information asymmetry between managers and investors. However, by separating the abnormal trading volume of minor investors from major investors, this relationship shows the information asymmetry between minor and major investors. In this research, the disclosure tone of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) is measured using Loughran and McDonald’s (L&M) finance-oriented dictionaries, and tone inconsistency is measured using a benchmark model. The data were collected from 143 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2020, totalling 1380 annual reports. The results show that MD&A tone inconsistency positively correlates with abnormal trading volume for all investors. In addition, MD&A tone inconsistency has a different impact on the trading behaviour of small and large investors and misleads the former. The present research contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the relationship between MD&A tone inconsistency and abnormal trading volume of small and major investors. It also uses both common words and word combinations to measure tone.

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of the ownership of institutional shareholders, the proportion of non-executive members, the percentage of ownership of major shareholders, the duality of the tasks of chief executive officer and chairman of the board of director, financial leverage, the amount of the remuneration of the board of director, the company’s life and the amount of export on internet financial reporting. Design/methodology/approach: For this purpose, the authors surveyed the 301 listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange in 2015. The statistical method used to test the hypothesis of the study was cross-sectional data. Findings: The results indicate the negative impact of ratio of non-executive members and the positive impact of financial leverage, size, liquidity and the life of the company in stock, over internet financial reporting. Originality/value: The current study is almost the first study which is conducted in a developing country, and the results may helpful to the other developing nations.