Outbreaks of emerging coronaviruses in the past two decades and the current pandemic of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) that emerged in China highlight the importance of this viral family as a zoonotic public health threat. To gain a better understanding of coronavirus presence and diversity in wildlife at wildlife-human interfaces in three southern provinces in Viet Nam 2013–2014, we used consensus Polymerase Chain Reactions to detect coronavirus sequences. In comparison to previous studies, we observed high proportions of positive samples among field rats (34.0%, 239/702) destined for human consumption and insectivorous bats in guano farms (74.8%, 234/313) adjacent to human dwellings. Most notably among field rats, the odds of coronavirus RNA detection significantly increased along the supply chain from field rats sold by traders (reference group; 20.7% positivity, 39/188) by a factor of 2.2 for field rats sold in large markets (32.0%, 116/363) and 10.0 for field rats sold and served in restaurants (55.6%, 84/151). Coronaviruses were also detected in rodents on the majority of wildlife farms sampled (60.7%, 17/28). These coronaviruses were found in the Malayan porcupines (6.0%, 20/331) and bamboo rats (6.3%, 6/96) that are raised on wildlife farms for human consumption as food. We identified six known coronaviruses in bats and rodents, clustered in three Coronaviridae genera, including the Alpha-, Beta-, and Gammacoronaviruses. Our analysis also suggested either mixing of animal excreta in the environment or interspecies transmission of coronaviruses, as both bat and avian coronaviruses were detected in rodent feces on wildlife farms. The mixing of multiple coronaviruses, and their apparent amplification along the wildlife supply chain into restaurants, suggests maximal risk for end consumers and likely underpins the mechanisms of zoonotic spillover to people.

Growing evidence suggests that multiple wildlife species can be infected with peste des petits ruminants virus (PPRV), with important consequences for the potential maintenance of PPRV in communities of susceptible hosts, and the threat that PPRV may pose to the conservation of wildlife populations and resilience of ecosystems. Significant knowledge gaps in the epidemiology of PPRV across the ruminant community (wildlife and domestic), and the understanding of infection in wildlife and other atypical host species groups (e.g., camelidae, suidae, and bovinae) hinder our ability to apply necessary integrated disease control and management interventions at the wildlife-livestock interface. Similarly, knowledge gaps limit the inclusion of wildlife in the FAO/OIE Global Strategy for the Control and Eradication of PPR, and the framework of activities in the PPR Global Eradication Programme that lays the foundation for eradicating PPR through national and regional efforts. This article reports on the first international meeting on, “Controlling PPR at the livestock-wildlife interface,” held in Rome, Italy, March 27–29, 2019. A large group representing national and international institutions discussed recent advances in our understanding of PPRV in wildlife, identified knowledge gaps and research priorities, and formulated recommendations. The need for a better understanding of PPRV epidemiology at the wildlife-livestock interface to support the integration of wildlife into PPR eradication efforts was highlighted by meeting participants along with the reminder that PPR eradication and wildlife conservation need not be viewed as competing priorities, but instead constitute two requisites of healthy socio-ecological systems.

African Swine Fever (ASF) is a highly contagious and fatal viral disease affecting both domestic and wild suids. The virus was introduced to Southeast Asia in early 2019 and has since spread rapidly throughout the region. Although significant efforts have been made to track and diagnose the disease in domestic pigs, very little is known about ASF in free‐ranging wild boar and their potential role in maintaining the disease within Southeast Asia. Through a collaboration between government and non‐government actors in Laos, Viet Nam, and Cambodia, investigations were conducted to (a) characterize the interface between domestic pigs and wild boar, (b) document risk factors for likely ASF spillover into wild boar populations by way of this interface, and (c) determine whether ASF in wild boar could be detected in each country. An extensive overlap between wild boar habitat and domestic pig ranging areas was found around villages bordering forests in all three countries, creating a high‐risk interface for viral spillover between domestic pig and wild boar populations. Fifteen and three wild boar carcasses were detected through passive reporting in Laos and Viet Nam, respectively, in 2019 and early 2020. Four of five carcasses screened in Laos and two of three in Viet Nam were confirmed positive for African swine fever virus using real‐time PCR. There were no confirmed reports of wild boar carcasses in Cambodia. This is the first confirmation of ASF in wild boar in Southeast Asia, the result of a probable viral spillover from domestic pigs, which highlights the importance of early reporting and monitoring of ASF in wild boar to enable the implementation of appropriate biosecurity measures.

Despite the discovery of several closely related viruses in bats, the direct evolutionary progenitor of SARS-CoV-2 has not yet been identified. In this study, we investigated potential animal sources of SARS-related coronaviruses using archived specimens from Sunda pangolins (Manis javanica) and Chinese pangolins (Manis pentadactyla) confiscated from the illegal wildlife trade, and from common palm civets (Paradoxurus hermaphroditus) raised on wildlife farms in Viet Nam. A total of 696 pangolin and civet specimens were screened for the presence of viral RNA from five zoonotic viral families and from Sarbecoviruses using primers specifically designed for pangolin coronaviruses. We also performed a curated data collection of media reports of wildlife confiscation events involving pangolins in Viet Nam between January 2016 and December 2020, to illustrate the global pangolin supply chain in the context of Viet Nam where the trade confiscated pangolins were sampled for this study. All specimens from pangolins and civets sampled along the wildlife supply chains between February 2017 and July 2018, in Viet Nam and tested with conventional PCR assays designed to detect flavivirus, paramyxovirus, filovirus, coronavirus, and orthomyxovirus RNA were negative. Civet samples were also negative for Sarbecoviruses, but 12 specimens from seven live pangolins confiscated in Hung Yen province, northern Viet Nam, in 2018 were positive for Sarbecoviruses. Our phylogenetic trees based on two fragments of the RdRp gene revealed that the Sarbecoviruses identified in these pangolins were closely related to pangolin coronaviruses detected in pangolins confiscated from the illegal wildlife trade in Yunnan and Guangxi provinces, China. Our curated data collection of media reports of wildlife confiscation events involving pangolins in Viet Nam between January 2016 and December 2020, reflected what is known about pangolin trafficking globally. Pangolins confiscated in Viet Nam were largely in transit, moving toward downstream consumers in China. Confiscations included pangolin scales sourced originally from Africa (and African species of pangolins), or pangolin carcasses and live pangolins native to Southeast Asia (predominately the Sunda pangolin) sourced from neighboring range countries and moving through Viet Nam toward provinces bordering China.

A One Health cross-sectoral surveillance approach was implemented to screen biological samples from bats, pigs, and humans at high-risk interfaces for zoonotic viral spillover for five viral families with zoonotic potential in Viet Nam. Over 1600 animal and human samples from bat guano harvesting sites, natural bat roosts, and pig farming operations were tested for coronaviruses (CoVs), paramyxoviruses, influenza viruses, filoviruses and flaviviruses using consensus PCR assays. Human samples were also tested using immunoassays to detect antibodies against eight virus groups. Significant viral diversity, including CoVs closely related to ancestors of pig pathogens, was detected in bats roosting at the human–animal interfaces, illustrating the high risk for CoV spillover from bats to pigs in Viet Nam, where pig density is very high. Season and reproductive period were significantly associated with the detection of bat CoVs, with site-specific effects. Phylogeographic analysis indicated localized viral transmission among pig farms. Our limited human sampling did not detect any known zoonotic bat viruses in human communities living close to the bat cave and harvesting bat guano, but our serological assays showed possible previous exposure to Marburg virus-like (Filoviridae), Crimean–Congo hemorrhagic fever virus-like (Bunyaviridae) viruses and flaviviruses. Targeted and coordinated One Health surveillance helped uncover this viral pathogen emergence hotspot.

Land bridges once assured transcontinental connectivity, but climate-induced habitat loss resulted in the extinc- tion of numerous North American large mammals. Using GPS technology on the formerly widespread but now endan- gered saiga in Mongolia, we identified a fine-scaled 5-km wide critical corridor, whose protection is critical for maintain- ing migration and meta-population structure. The world's great overland migrations are disappearing, truncating fundamental processes that have contributed to ecosystem functioning for millennia. With more people reli- ant on lands that were once remote, intact habitats are now replaced by livestock, fences, and people (1). Nevertheless, expansive grasslands and deserts in China, Mongolia, Ka- zakhstan, and Russia still sustain extraordinary movements between winter and summer ranges, including those of chiru (Pantholops hodgsonii), white-(Procapra gutturosa) and black-tailed (Gazella subgutturosa) gazelles, khulan (Equus hemionus), saiga (Saiga tatarica), and Bactrian camels (Camelus bactrianus) (2 - 4). The latter three species - all recognized as endangered by the IUCN - along with mam- moths, Panthera lions, and wild horses (Equus spp.) once moved between Asia and North America using the Bering Land Bridge. That conduit for inter-continental movement collapsed during the Late Pleistocene when climate changed, ocean levels rose, and the arid Mammoth Steppe of Beringea disappeared (5). Although saiga, camels, and wild horses were dependent upon these cold-adapted xeric grasslands, such remnant Pleistocene habitats and their associated fauna currently persist in situ only in Central Asia (5). While the Being Land Bridge once enabled connectivity across broad landscapes, today's conservation challenges are appropriately more linked to the maintenance of connectivity among population subunits, protecting corridors at a fine scale, and understanding the direct impacts of humans under an umbrella of climate change. Long-term conservation of fragmented populations requires maintenance of meta- population structure. With the above little-known relicts re- stricted to Central Asia, a critical challenge has been the ac- quisition of knowledge, not only about migration routes, if any, but the protection of land(s) critical to sustaining movements among disjunct population segments (6).