We have heard ever more about the growing Russian presence in Africa in the past few years, which might appear strange for many people. Those, however, who know the history of the Black Continent, also know that Russian presence is not a new phenomenon. Africa was an important place during the Cold War where the Soviet Union not only competed with the United States of America, but also with China. For those who observed the robustly growing US and Chinese Africa policies, it could have appeared after the end of the classic Cold War, that the Russians had retreated beyond the borders of their country, abandoning the Black Continent in favour of their previous rivals. However, it did not happen, because the Russians did not close their diplomatic missions as they did in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the Russians played a key role in UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa, where they provided the necessary Air Transportation Capabilities together with the Ukrainians. Today it is becoming obvious that not only a new form of the Cold War has been resumed between the West and Russia but also the fact that the Russian “retreat” was only temporary. The relations with African countries are becoming increasingly important not only for the Russians, but also for the Africans, who need no longer choose between the American and the Chinese way of development. Even though the US and China did not view Russia as a competitor in the recent past, taking into account the events of the past few years the situation has changed. We also need to see that Russia—similarly to China—is primarily a competitor to US great power interests. China intends to cooperate with Russia, rather than competing, whilst not denying the existence of competition between the two countries. I would like to give a picture of this process in my study, including the changing balance of powers in Africa.

This article explores terrorism against healthcare facilities and workers throughout the world since September 11, 2001 to assess trends in these attacks. Using five datasets, it examines the increased risk of terrorist attacks against healthcare facilities and workers, and analyzes when, where and how these largely soft targets have been attacked by terrorists. The article provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis about the types of attacks and concludes with recommendations for healthcare facilities to mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks as well as provides suggestions for further studies.

The appearance of COVID-19 is proving to be a difficult challenge not only for Africa but for the whole world. In order to prevent and curb, the leaders of the countries had to introduce health, economic and political changes and regulations, which were repeatedly sharply criticized. Although statistics show that the spread of the virus in Africa was far from the same as in China, Europe or the Americas, the world's strictest restrictions had to be put in place to stop the pandemic. At the same time, Africa has cut itself off from its main supporters, making its economic situation more difficult and risking the already weak stability of African societies.

This is a comparative analysis of the secret service of al-Shabaab, the Amniyat, and the Somali government’s security unit, the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). It begins with the short history of al-Shabaab as an introduction to understand the roots of the movement and how the resurgence of the group is tied to the effective management of the Amniyat. Then it analyzes the capabilities and capacities of the intelligence apparatuses of al-Shabaab and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), highlighting the similarities and differences between the organizations. Viewed from the perspective of the local population, the terrorist group provides security and predictability for individuals living under its control, gained local respect for managing its forces, and uses its secret service, the Amniyat, effectively. NISA suffers from the same problems as its predecessor in the Siad Barre regime, such as lack of transparency, overpoliticization, and involvement in illegal activities. Furthermore, there is lack of cooperation and transparency between local intelligence services and police forces. While the FGS realized the importance of doing away with clan-based security systems, the dominance of clans is still constantly increasing at the expense of the government. Today, al-Shabaab’s intelligence capacities and capabilities are more advanced than those of the NISA, hence the centralization and unification of the security architecture is of chief importance.

Between the 18th and 26th of November 2016, 220 different locations went up in flames in the Israeli forest. Israeli firefighters were powerless to contain the fires, so army and police units had to contribute. Thousands of civilian volunteers also joined the fight against the fire. The Israeli firemen were unable to curb the continuously blazing fires, which is why the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, asked and received international support. The operation lasted for eight days, more than 1,700 fires were eliminated, but the conflagration caused considerable damage. Due to the extremely dry and windy periods, many blamed the weather conditions for the damage, but it soon became clear that in several cases, the cause was arson. Although arson as a method of extremism has been continuously practiced in many incidents worldwide, it is still beyond the scope of research on terrorism. This essay aims to prove that we have to raise awareness of the issue, highlighting both relevant incidents and the extremist group’s propaganda incentive towards the enhanced use of arson. We raise the question whether on the basis of the incidents in Israel, arson could become a frequently used method of European terrorist units or individuals. And if yes, how the national counter-terrorist and law-enforcement agencies may adapt to the challenge of hardly controllable arson in order to minimize the chance of similarly executed attacks in the future.

The objective of this qualitative study is to raise awareness of the online presence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab and Boko Haram by analyzing and comparing their social media activities. The decision that the above-mentioned terrorist organizations shall be selected for inclusion was based on the fact that (I.) they are active in Africa, (II.) they are currently or affiliated with three of the deadliest international terrorist groups in the continent and (III.) they use social media in order to achieve their goals. I conclude that social media is used by all three of the studied terrorist organizations with special attention devoted to mainstream social media platforms, namely Twitter, YouTube and - to a lesser extent - Facebook. Additionally, AQIM, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram seem to have primarily used social media for propaganda purposes, although it was also utilized as a recruitment tool, albeit to varying degrees. Finally, I believe social media can also be used for coordination and funding by the studied terrorist groups; although the small amount of publicly accessible evidence entails qualitative problems, indicating the fact there is room for further research.