Jay Junghun Lee

Dr. Jay Junghun Lee

Accounting and Finance Department, University of Massachusetts Boston, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
Professor of Accounting at the University of Massachusetts B...

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 February 2012 in Review of Accounting Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
IHIn-Mu Haw
In-Mu Haw
BHBingbing Hu
Bingbing Hu
Jay Junghun LeeJay Junghun Lee
Jay Junghun Lee
WWWoody Wu
Woody Wu

1 March 2011 in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JCJong-Hag Choi
Jong-Hag Choi
JKJeong-Bon Kim
Jeong-Bon Kim
Jay Junghun LeeJay Junghun Lee
Jay Junghun Lee

1 July 2015 in Journal of Banking & Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
IHIn-Mu Haw
In-Mu Haw
BHBingbing Hu
Bingbing Hu
Jay Junghun LeeJay Junghun Lee
Jay Junghun Lee

24 September 2013 in Contemporary Accounting Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
IHIn‐Mu Haw
In‐Mu Haw
Jay Junghun LeeJay Junghun Lee
Jay Junghun Lee
WLWoo‐Jong Lee
Woo‐Jong Lee

5 November 2020 in Journal of International Business Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JCJames N Cannon
James N Cannon
BHBingbing Hu
Bingbing Hu
Jay Junghun LeeJay Junghun Lee
Jay Junghun Lee
DYDaoguang Yang
Daoguang Yang

17 August 2019 in Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JKJeong-Bon Kim
Jeong-Bon Kim
Jay Junghun LeeJay Junghun Lee
Jay Junghun Lee
JPJong Chool Park
Jong Chool Park
Firms with internal control weakness (ICW) problems are less likely to provide managers with timely and precise information useful for internal resource management. The real options theory implies that managers in ICW firms, faced with information uncertainty, are more likely to postpone downward adjustments of slack resources by exercising an option to wait until more information about future business prospects becomes available. Based upon this theory, we hypothesize and find that selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs are stickier for ICW firms than for non-ICW firms. We also find that the effect of ICW on SG&A cost stickiness is primarily attributable to internal information control problems, and becomes weakened significantly after firms remediate previously reported ICW. This impact of ICW on SG&A cost stickiness is robust to controlling for the possible influence of omitted variables, accounting for potential endogeneity in the presence of ICW, and using a firm-specific measure of cost stickiness. Our results are consistent with the prediction of the real options theory in that poor information quality associated with ICW incents managers to postpone downward adjustments of SG&A resources until the information uncertainty is resolved.