We explore the impact of complex ownership structure and judicial efficiency on firm leverage at Pakistani pyramid firms. Ratio of controlling to ownership rights is much higher at Pakistani firms than in other economies, which motivates us to study its impact on leverage. Our results reveal that complex internal structure at Pakistani pyramid firms is positively related to leverage. We find that the presence of efficient courts weaken the impact of complex ownership structure on leverage at pyramid firms. Contrary to the literature, we find that the political connections of pyramid firms in Pakistan are not related to corporate leverage.

We compare Chinese single with dual-class firms cross-listed on US exchanges. We find that dual-class firms are larger in terms of assets and sales, possess ownership concentration, and have higher institutional ownership. Chinese firms in IT industry are especially likely to use dual-class structure. We find that, contrary to the literature, dual-class firms underprice 30.42% more and firm underprices less when governance practices are adequate. Insiders need to bear underpricing cost for retaining control. Interestingly, we find that dual-class firms hire more independent directors to show commitment toward shareholder’s rights but control them through CEO Chairman Duality and superior voting rights.