Teresa Bejarano-Fernández

Prof. Dr. Teresa Bejarano-Fernández

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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30 June 2011
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TBTeresa Bejarano-Fernández
Teresa Bejarano-Fernández
What do the pointing gesture, the imitation of new complex motor patterns, the evocation of absent objects and the grasping of others’ false beliefs all have in common? Apart from being (one way or other) involved in the language, they all would share a demanding requirement – a second mental centre within the subject. This redefinition of the simulationism is extended in the present book in two directions. Firstly, mirror-neurons and, likewise, animal abilities connected with the visual field of their fellows, although they certainly constitute important landmarks, would not require this second mental centre. Secondly, others’ beliefs would have given rise not only to predicative communicative function but also to pre-grammatical syntax. The inquiry about the evolutionary-historic origin of language focuses on the cognitive requirements on it as a faculty (but not to the indirect causes such as environmental changes or greater co-operation), pays attention to children, and covers other human peculiarities as well, e.g., symbolic play, protodeclaratives, self-conscious emotions, and interactional or four-hand tasks.

24 November 2022 in Isidorianum
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TBTeresa Bejarano-Fernández
Teresa Bejarano-Fernández
The attempts to make moral and evolution compatible have assimilated moral capacity either with complex self-control in favour of one’s own goals or with spontaneous altruism. Those attempts face an easy problem, since those two senses of moral are adaptively advantageous resources. But let us focus on the decisions made in favour of another person which the subject, when making them, feels are contrary to his own goals: Could a base for this capacity arise in evolution, however poor and weak? I propose that such base, while it is not an adaptive advantage but quite the opposite, arises from the convergence between two abilities which in their respective origins were adaptively very advantageous: the advanced mode of ‘theory-of-mind’ (ToM) and inner speech.

20 November 2020 in Isidorianum
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TBTeresa Bejarano-Fernández
Teresa Bejarano-Fernández
Varios recursos empleados en la construcción de un grupo de parábolas coinciden con puntos que la ciencia actual enfoca. 1) El hecho de que la situación ajena es percibida de un modo más objetivo, con menos sesgos, que la situación propia. 2) El “altruismo espontáneo”, que empuja a conductas automáticas de ayuda. 3) La enorme influencia que el lenguaje puede ejercer para modular la atención, tanto la ajena como la propia. 4) La coherencia cognitiva, que interviene en el autocontrol, tanto el autocontrol moral como el que está al servicio de los propios intereses del sujeto. Al analizar el efecto de esos puntos en las parábolas en cuestión, intento mostrar que las capacidades comunicativas humanas están allí funcionando al máximo para facilitar la decisión del oyente, y que esa facilitación o ayuda es diferente por completo a las manipulaciones de cualquier tipo.

12 February 2025 in Humans
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TBTeresa Bejarano-Fernández
Teresa Bejarano-Fernández
Is there a qualitative difference between apes’ and humans ‘ability to estimate others’ mental states’, a.k.a. ‘Theory-of-Mind’? After opting for the idea that expectations are empty profiles that recognize a particular content when it arrives, I apply the same description to ‘vicarious expectations’—very probably present in apes. Thus, (empty) vicarious expectations and one’s (full) contents are distinguished without needing meta-representation. Then, I propose: First, vicarious expectations are enough to support apes’ Theory-of-Mind (including ‘spontaneous altruism’). Second, since vicarious expectations require a profile previously built in the subject that activates them, this subject cannot activate any vicarious expectation of mental states that are intrinsically impossible for him. Third, your mental states that think of me as a distal individual are intrinsically impossible states for me, and therefore, to estimate them, I must estimate your mental contents. This ability (the original nucleus of the human Theory-of-Mind) is essential in the human lifestyle. It is involved in unpleasant and pleasant self-conscious emotions, which respectively contribute to ‘social order’ and to cultural innovations. More basically, it makes possible human (prelinguistic or linguistic) communication, since it originally made possible the understanding of others’ mental states as states that are addressed to me, and that are therefore impossible for me.

1 January 2003 in Pragmatics & Cognition
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TBTeresa Bejarano-Fernández
Teresa Bejarano-Fernández
Both metarepresentation and cultural learning have an identical origin. The imitation of new and complex motor patterns (also articulatory-phonetic patterns) is a crucial skill not only because it enables cultural transmission but also because its high requisites give rise to the exclusively human mind. The premotor plan at the base of such imitation requires the ability to fictionalize bodily postures, which implies a second line of awareness. Only by means of this second line can the human being deal with situations different from his own real and current situation. This permanent double cognitive architecture explains finger-pointing, laughing, and also all capacities considered metarepresentational. Evocation and metabeliefs (these latter being the starting point of syntax) result in language formation. There are two operating modes of the double line, which starting respectively with motor learning and finger-pointing, give rise to pretence and metabelief, and whose distinct nature can also account for the difference between fictionally triggered emotions and morality.

1 January 2015 in Thémata
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TBTeresa Bejarano-Fernández
Teresa Bejarano-Fernández