Following the financial crisis, financial sector organizations faced increased pressures to reform their ‘risk cultures’. In this paper, we argue that the emergence of regulatory and managerial attention to risk culture is symptomatic of pressures to redefine the fundamental ends of financial institutions and to rebalance the pre‐crisis emphasis on a logic of opportunity and risk‐taking with a logic of precaution and risk control. Based on the analysis of normative practitioner texts and on extended contact with regulators, advisers and corporate actors in the UK financial sector over four years, we show how this initial complexity ofendsis translated into uncertainty and conflict about themeansthrough which risk culture might become an object amenable to intervention. On this basis, we contribute to the growing literature on ‘institutional complexity’ by showing how organizational actors address conflicting pressures aboutbothends and means, and by discussing some key implications of their simplification strategies. Our analysis also contributes to recent studies of ‘means‐ends decoupling’, showing how means, ends and the object of intervention itself – risk culture – co‐evolve as they are reconstructed by organizational actors via their everyday practices.

The rise of financial technology (FinTech) has generated substantial research on its adoption by customers and the associated implications for traditional banks. This systematic review addresses two questions: (1) What factors enable or hinder consumer adoption of FinTech? (2) How does consumer adoption of FinTech affect the performance of traditional banks? Following the PRISMA guidelines, we screened and analyzed 109 peer-reviewed articles published between 2016 and 2024 in Scopus and Web of Science. The findings show that adoption is driven by economic incentives, digital infrastructure, personalized services, and institutional support, while barriers include limited literacy, perceived risk, and regulatory uncertainty. At the bank level, adoption enhances operational efficiency, customer loyalty, and revenue growth but also generates compliance costs, cybersecurity risks, and competition. Consumer adoption studies primarily employ the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT), often extended with trust and privacy constructs. In contrast, bank performance research relies on empirical analyses with limited theoretical grounding. This review bridges behavioral and institutional perspectives by linking consumer-level drivers of adoption with organizational outcomes, offering an integrated conceptual framework. The limitations include a restriction of the retrieved literature to English publications in two databases. Future work should apply longitudinal, multi-theory models to deepen the understanding of how consumer behavior shapes bank performance.

We analyse the possibility of successful industry self‐regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this article presents a game‐theoretic typology of generic self‐regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. We discuss the advertising, press and life insurance industries in the UK as examples of the scenarios. Conclusions for corporate and public policy are offered.