Financial time series analyses have played an important role in developing some of the fundamental economic theories. However, many of the published analyses of financial time series focus on long-term average behavior of a market, and thus shed little light on the temporal evolution of a market, which from time to time may be interrupted by stock crashes and financial crises. Consequently, in terms of complexity science, it is still unknown whether the market complexity during a stock crash decreases or increases. To answer this question, we have examined the temporal variation of permutation entropy (PE) in Chinese stock markets by computing PE from high-frequency composite indies of two stock markets: the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). We have found that PE decreased significantly in two significant time windows, each encompassing a rapid market rise and then a few gigantic stock crashes. One window started in the middle of 2006, long before the 2008 global financial crisis, and continued up to early 2011. The other window was more recent, started in the middle of 2014, and ended in the middle of 2016. Since both windows were at least one year long, and proceeded stock crashes by at least half a year, the decrease in PE can be invaluable warning signs for regulators and investors alike.

How different are the emerging and the well-developed stock markets in terms of efficiency? To gain insights into this question, we compared an important emerging market, the Chinese stock market, and the largest and the most developed market, the US stock market. Specifically, we computed the Lempel–Ziv complexity (LZ) and the permutation entropy (PE) from two composite stock indices, the Shanghai stock exchange composite index (SSE) and the Dow Jones industrial average (DJIA), for both low-frequency (daily) and high-frequency (minute-to-minute)stock index data. We found that the US market is basically fully random and consistent with efficient market hypothesis (EMH), irrespective of whether low- or high-frequency stock index data are used. The Chinese market is also largely consistent with the EMH when low-frequency data are used. However, a completely different picture emerges when the high-frequency stock index data are used, irrespective of whether the LZ or PE is computed. In particular, the PE decreases substantially in two significant time windows, each encompassing a rapid market rise and then a few gigantic stock crashes. To gain further insights into the causes of the difference in the complexity changes in the two markets, we computed the Hurst parameter H from the high-frequency stock index data of the two markets and examined their temporal variations. We found that in stark contrast with the US market, whose H is always close to 1/2, which indicates fully random behavior, for the Chinese market, H deviates from 1/2 significantly for time scales up to about 10 min within a day, and varies systemically similar to the PE for time scales from about 10 min to a day. This opens the door for large-scale collective behavior to occur in the Chinese market, including herding behavior and large-scale manipulation as a result of inside information.

This paper shows that the empirical distribution of cross-sectional analyst coverage in China’s stock markets follows an exponential law in a given month from 2011 to 2020. The findings hold in both the emerging (Shanghai) and the developed market (Hong Kong). Moreover, the unique distribution parameter (i.e., mean) is directly related to the amount of market-wide information. Average analyst coverage exhibits a significant negative predictive power for stock-market uncertainty, highlighting the role of security analysts in diminishing the total uncertainty. The exponential law can be derived from the maximum entropy principle (MEP). When analysts, who are constrained by average ability in generating information (i.e., the first-order moment), strive to maximize the amount of market-wide information, this objective yields the exponential distribution. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that security analysts specialize in the generation of firm-specific information, empirical findings suggest that analysts primarily produce market-wide information for 25 countries. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why cross-sectional analyst coverage reflects market-wide information, this paper provides an entropy-based explanation.

Systemic risks have to be vigilantly guided against at all times in order to prevent their contagion across stock markets. New policies also may not work as desired and even induce shocks to market, especially those emerging ones. Therefore, timely detection of systemic risks and policy-induced shocks is crucial to safeguard the health of stock markets. In this paper, we show that the relative entropy or Kullback–Liebler divergence can be used to identify systemic risks and policy-induced shocks in stock markets. Concretely, we analyzed the minutely data of two stock indices, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) Composite Index, and examined the temporal variation of relative entropy for them. We show that clustered peaks in relative entropy curves can accurately identify the timing of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis and its precursors, and the 2015 stock crashes in China. Moreover, a sharpest needle-like peak in relative entropy curves, especially for the SSE market, always served as a precursor of an unusual market, a strong bull market or a bubble, thus possessing a certain ability of forewarning.

This paper shows that the empirical distribution of cross-sectional analyst coverage in China's stock markets follows an exponential law in a given month from 2011 to 2020. The findings hold in both the emerging (Shanghai) and the developed market (Hong Kong). Moreover, the unique distribution parameter (i.e., mean) is directly related to the amount of market-wide information. Average analyst coverage exhibits a significant negative predictive power for stock-market uncertainty, highlighting the role of security analysts in diminishing the total uncertainty. The exponential law can be derived from the maximum entropy principle (MEP). When analysts, who are constrained by average ability in generating information (i.e., the first-order moment), strive to maximize the amount of market-wide information, this objective yields the exponential distribution. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that security analysts specialize in the generation of firm-specific information, empirical findings suggest that analysts primarily produce market-wide information for 25 countries. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why cross-sectional analyst coverage reflects market-wide information, this paper provides an entropy-based explanation.