Avian influenza A(H9N2) virus isolated from a poultry worker in Pakistan in 2015 was closely related to viruses detected in poultry farms. Observed mutations in the hemagglutinin related to receptor-binding affinity and antigenicity could affect cross-reactivity with prepandemic H9N2 vaccine strains.

Surveillance of H9N2 is currently focused on areas central to the commercial poultry industry. This study determined the prevalence of H9N2 virus in commercial and backyard poultry flocks in Punjab Province, Pakistan. Oral and tracheal swabs were collected from commercial and backyard poultry from January 2015 through June 2016. Antisera against H5, H7, H9, and Newcastle disease viruses were used for virus identification. Molecular confirmation was made by reverse transcription PCR. Avian influenza virus subtypes H5 and H7 were not detected. The H9N2 virus was isolated in 5.7% of 905 tested flocks (5–10 birds/flock). Prevalence in commercial and backyard poultry was 6.7% of 687 flocks and 2.7% of 218 flocks, respectively. Hemagglutinin and neuraminidase-gene-based phylogenetic analysis of commercial and backyard poultry isolates showed 100% homology. Within sublineage B2 of Pakistan, identity among most recent isolates (2015) was 100%, compared to 75%–99% identity with previously isolated viruses (2010–12), indicating continued virus evolution. Most of the previously reported and currently studied viruses were isolated near the Pakistan-India border. Phylogenetic analysis showed that Pakistani and Indian isolates were closely related, indicating that avian influenza virus transmission may occur across this border.

The highly pathogenic (HPAI) avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses have undergone reassortment with multiple non-N1-subtype neuraminidase genes since 2008, leading to the emergence of H5Nx viruses. H5Nx viruses established themselves quickly in birds and disseminated from China to Africa, the Middle East, Europe and North America. Multiple genetic clades have successively evolved through frequent mutations and reassortment, posing a continuous threat to domestic poultry and causing substantial economic losses. Live bird markets are recognized as major sources of avian-to-human infection and for the emergence of zoonotic influenza. In Pakistan, the A(H5N1) virus was first reported in domestic birds in 2007; however, avian influenza surveillance is limited and there is a lack of knowledge on the evolution and transmission of the A(H5) virus in the country. We collected oropharyngeal swabs from domestic poultry and environmental samples from six different live bird markets during 2018–2019. We detected and sequenced HPAI A(H5N8) viruses from two chickens, one quail and one environmental sample in two markets. Temporal phylogenetics indicated that all novel HPAI A(H5N8) viruses belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b, with all eight genes of Pakistan A(H5N8) viruses most closely related to 2017 Saudi Arabia A(H5N8) viruses, which were likely introduced via cross-border transmission from neighboring regions approximately three months prior to virus detection into domestic poultry. Our data further revealed that clade 2.3.4.4b viruses underwent rapid lineage expansion in 2017 and acquired significant amino acid mutations, including mutations associated with increased haemagglutinin affinity to human α-2,6 receptors, prior to the first human A(H5N8) infection in Russian poultry workers in 2020. These results highlight the need for systematic avian influenza surveillance in live bird markets in Pakistan to monitor for potential A(H5Nx) variants that may arise from poultry populations.