Introduction: Despite the emphasis on reporting of Adverse Events Following Immunisation (AEFIs) during didactic training sessions, especially prior to new vaccine introductions, it remains low in Ghana. We explored the factors underlying the under-reporting of AEFI by healthcare workers (HCWs) to provide guidance on appropriate interventions to increase reporting. Methods: We conducted an exploratory descriptive in-depth study of the factors contributing to low reporting of AEFI among HCWs in four regions in Ghana. Key informant interviews (KII) were held with purposively selected individuals that are relevant to the AEFI reporting process at the district, regional, and national levels. We used KII guides to conduct in-depth interviews and used NVivo 10 qualitative software to analyse the data. Themes on factors influencing AEFI reporting were derived inductively from the data, and illustrative quotes from respondents were used to support the narratives. Results: We conducted 116 KIIs with the health managers, regulators and frontline HCWs and found that lack of information on reportable AEFIs and reporting structures, misunderstanding of reportable AEFIs, heavy workload, cost of reporting AEFIs, fear of blame by supervisors, lack of motivation, and inadequate feedback as factors responsible for underreporting of AEFIs. Respondents suggested that capacity building for frontline HCWs, effective supervision, the provision of motivation and feedback, simplification of reporting procedures, incentives for integrating AEFI reporting into routine monitoring and reporting, standardization of reporting procedures across regions, and developing appropriate interventions to address the fear of personal consequences would help improve AEFI reporting. Conclusion: From the perspectives of a broad range of key informants at all levels of the vaccine safety system, we found multiple factors (both structural and behavioural), that may impact HCW reporting of AEFI in Ghana. Improvements in line with the suggestions are necessary for increased AEFI reporting in Ghana.
Background: Many health departments and private enterprises began offering SARS-CoV-2 testing to travelers at US airports in 2020. Persons with positive SARS-CoV-2 test results who have planned upcoming travel may be subject to US federal public health travel restrictions. We assessed availability of testing for SARS-CoV-2 at major US airports. We then describe the management of cases and close contacts at Denver International Airport’s testing site. Methods: We selected 100 US airports. Online surveys were conducted during November–December 2020 and assessed availability of testing for air travelers, flight crew, and airport employees. Respondents included health department (HD) staff or airport directors. We analyzed testing data and management practices for persons who tested positive and their close contacts at one airport (Denver International) from 12/21/2020 to 3/31/2021. Results: Among the 100 selected airports, we received information on 77 airports; 38 (49%) had a testing site and several more planned to offer one (N = 7; 9%). Most sites began testing in the fall of 2020. The most frequently offered tests were RT-PCR or other NAAT tests (N = 28). Denver International Airport offered voluntary SARS-CoV-2 testing. Fifty-four people had positive results among 5724 tests conducted from 12/21/2020 to 3/31/2021 for a total positivity of < 1%. Of these, 15 were travelers with imminent flights. The Denver HD issued an order requiring the testing site to immediately report cases and notify airlines to cancel upcoming flight itineraries for infected travelers and their traveling close contacts, minimizing the use of federal travel restrictions. Conclusions: As of December 2020, nearly half of surveyed US airports had SARS-CoV-2 testing sites. Such large-scale adoption of airport testing for a communicable disease is unprecedented and presents new challenges for travelers, airlines, airports, and public health authorities. This assessment was completed before the US and other countries began enforcing entry testing requirements; testing at airports will likely increase as travel demand returns and test requirements for travel evolve. Lessons from Denver demonstrate how HDs can play a key role in engaging airport testing sites to ensure people who test positive for SARS-CoV-2 immediately before travel do not travel on commercial aircraft.
Background: In 2017, the Expanded Programme on Immunization in Ghana opened two container clinics in Accra, which were cargo containers outfitted to deliver immunizations. At each clinic, we assessed performance and clinic acceptance during the first 12 months of implementation. Methods: We employed a descriptive mixed-method design using monthly administrative immunization data, exit interviews with caregivers of children of <5 years (N = 107), focus group discussions (FGDs) with caregivers (n = 6 FGDs) and nurses (n = 2 FGDs), and in-depth interviews (IDIs) with community leaders (n = 3) and health authorities (n = 3). Results: Monthly administrative data showed that administered vaccine doses increased from 94 during the opening month to 376 in the 12th month across both clinics. Each clinic exceeded its target doses for the 12–23 month population (second dose of measles). Almost all (98%) exit interview participants stated that the clinics made it easier to receive child health services compared to previous health service interactions. The accessibility and acceptability of the container clinics were also supported from health worker and community perspectives. Conclusions: Our initial data support container clinics as an acceptable strategy for delivering immunization services in urban populations, at least in the short term. They can be rapidly deployed and designed to serve working mothers in strategic areas.
5 November 2025 in The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene
: Enhancing surveillance for adverse events following immunization remains a key global immunization priority. Many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are implementing new vaccines without the comprehensive safety monitoring typically conducted in high-income countries. Since 2017, the Global Immunization Safety Team at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in collaboration with partners, has supported establishing sentinel surveillance systems during vaccine introductions for safety monitoring in LMICs. Through these experiences, many lessons have been learned regarding project initiation, funding opportunities, standardizing data collection, background rate challenges, site selection considerations, and partner coordination. If vaccine safety is prioritized, sentinel surveillance enhances routine monitoring and generates valuable safety data, strengthening the immunization and regulatory programs. As many countries introduce and manufacture vaccines not previously monitored in high-income countries, lessons from safety monitoring during earlier vaccine introductions must be applied. Sustaining the gains in immunization that were hard-earned over the past decades depends on it.
Objective: We sought to estimate the proportion of air travelers who may have been infected with SARS-CoV-2 upon arrival to Colorado by comparing data on Colorado residents screened upon entering the US to COVID-19 cases reported in the state. Data on Colorado’s screened passengers arriving into the US between January 17 and July 30, 2020 were compared to Colorado’s Electronic Disease Reporting System. We conducted a descriptive analysis of true matches, including age, gender, case status, symptom status, time from arrival to symptom onset (days), and time from arrival to specimen collection date (days). Results: Fourteen confirmed COVID-19 cases in travelers who were diagnosed within 14 days after arriving in Colorado were matched to the 8,272 travelers who underwent screening at 15 designated airports with a recorded destination of Colorado, or 0.2%. Most (N = 13/14 or 93%) of these infected travelers arrived in Colorado in March 2020; 12 (86%) of them were symptomatic. Entry screening for COVID-19 and the sharing of traveler information with the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment appeared to identify few cases early in the pandemic. Symptom-based entry screening and sharing of traveler information was minimally effective at decreasing travel-associated COVID-19 transmission.