Observing the fast development of livestreaming, this paper investigates its adoption on the retail platform and examines its impact on merchants. We develop a game-theoretic model in which a leading retailer and a third-party seller engage in price competition. Our model fully considers the initiative of live streamers in this asymmetric competition. We find that the streamer’s cost and the seller’s initial awareness are two key factors affecting the adoption of livestreaming. Specifically, when the streamer’s cost is low, or it is intermediate and the seller’s initial awareness is high, the retailer adopts and opens livestreaming and the seller also adopts it; when both factors are intermediate, the retailer adopts livestreaming but does not open it to the seller; when both factors are high, the retailer adopts and opens livestreaming but the seller does not adopt it; otherwise, the retailer does not adopt livestreaming. Our results also suggest that the presence of livestreaming benefits the retailer but may hurt the seller especially when the seller’s initial awareness is high. Our findings provide relevant and useful implications for both the platform retailer and third-party seller in their livestreaming decisions.
This paper examines the impact of introducing a green own-brand product on an e-commerce platform, the incumbent competing sellers, and the environment. We develop a stylized model wherein a green seller and a non-green seller directly sell products to consumers through an e-commerce platform. The platform has the option to introduce its own-brand product and sell it within its marketplace. In scenarios where no brand introduction occurs, only two incumbents compete in the marketplace. However, with the introduction of the platform’s own brand, three products compete in the marketplace. Our findings reveal several noteworthy results. Firstly, the introduction of the platform’s own brand may diminish its profit, even when there are no development costs associated with the brand. Particularly intriguing is the observation that the platform’s profit may decrease as the product greenness of its own brand increases. Secondly, under certain conditions, both incumbent sellers can experience improved outcomes with the introduction of the platform’s green brand. Thirdly, while the platform’s green brand introduction does not invariably enhance the supply chain’s environmental performance, it may diminish it in instances where the base demand for the platform’s own brand is substantial and the eco-friendliness of the brand falls within a mid-range spectrum.