Can environmental regulation be used to promote directed technical change and economic growth simultaneously? We construct an endogenous economic growth model that includes environmental regulation, the extent of environmental pollution, and economic performance in a general equilibrium framework. We show that in the absence of government intervention, environmental pollution will not automatically disappear as economic growth increases. Furthermore, “threshold constraints” result from “path dependence” in the type of innovation; only when the rate of carbon tax and carbon reduction subsidy reaches a certain extent will individuals (or producers) redirect technical change toward “clean” energy production technologies innovation and away from “dirty” energy production technologies. Our article also discloses the intrinsic principle and micromechanism of environmental regulation to promote economic growth and finds that strict environmental regulation will both significantly promote the evolving labor division in clean energy production technologies innovation and achieve the benefits of improved average labor productivity in the production sector and the market size of goods, so that the benefit exceeds the switching cost.

This study employs scenario analysis to measure the carbon emissions reduction potential of the final demand structure changes in China from 2013 to 2020. The results indicate that under the business as usual (BAU) scenario (i.e. in which China’s final demand structure, energy structure and technical level in 2020 are the same as those in 2012), China’s gross domestic product of 2020 calculated by 2005 constant price is 6,427,658,783×10,000 yuan and China’s total carbon emissions will reach 1,531,692.29×10,000 tons, with its carbon emission intensity standing at 2.3686 t/10,000 yuan (it is only 25.57% lower than in 2005). Furthermore, under the specific final demand product structure (when “government consumption”, “export consumption”, “residents’ consumption + capital formation” accounts for 12%, 18% and 70%of final demand, respectively), China’s total carbon emissions in 2020 will be reduced by between 167,595.33×10,000 and 204,142.45×10,000 tons compared to the BAU scenario, and carbon emission intensity nationwide will be reduced by 33.71-35.49% compared with 2005. Finally, based on the assumptions and conclusions, this study puts forward some suggestions to realize the China’s carbon emission reduction commitments.

Green agriculture can improve biodiversity, increase farmers’ income, reduce agricultural non-point source pollution, solve food safety issues, and will be an important way to promote sustainable development in China. At present, the green transformation of China’s agriculture has encountered a bottleneck in the development of a green agricultural product market. How to develop a green agricultural product market has become an issue worthy of in-depth study in the academia. Previous studies have already given persuasive explanations for the inability to form a green agricultural product market, but few have explored its development path from the angle of cooperation. By employing the method of a Transferable Utilities (TU) cooperative game, and based on theoretical analyses and hypothetical data, this thesis aims to prove the effectiveness of the multilateral coalition to develop the green agricultural product market in China. The results show the effectiveness of the developed model of the green agricultural product market in which producers, consumers, food safety inspection departments, and e-commerce platforms cooperate with each other. This model meets the objective needs of the times and that of the market economy. According to the marginal contribution value of participants in different coalition orders, this thesis finds 6 kinds of coalition orders. When producers and consumers of green agricultural products enter the coalition in the last place, the marginal contribution value is maximized, which reflects the importance of the supply side and demand side of green agricultural products. In other words, the development of the green agricultural product market is a dynamic process—determined by consumers and promoted by producers—in which both sides promote and restrict each other. Finally, this article presents two policy recommendations: at the national level, to clearly proposes a strategy to build a green agricultural product e-commerce platform in China and to launch a pilot application for the specialized e-commerce platform for green agricultural products in the Guizhou province.

Based on the “centripetal force” and “centrifugal force” of the intermolecular distance model in physics, this article establishes a worthwhile and original mathematical model to analyze the influence of the distribution of cities on urban labor productivity. We incorporate the crowding parameter into the local spillover model and demonstrate the existence of the optimal intercity distance. In addition, we estimate the optimal intercity distance for urban economic efficiency by using data from Chinese prefecture-level cities. Judging from the deviation between the actual average distance and the optimal average distance in each region, the cities in the eastern region are overcrowding, and the cities in the central and western regions are too sparse. Findings in this study carry several important policy implications. For areas in the central and western regions with large administrative areas and large populations, it would be appropriate to increase the number of prefecture-level cities and industrial density through industrial transfer and development. This approach is conducive not only to improving the economic efficiency of the central and western cities and reducing the congestion of eastern cities but also to accommodating the radiation effect of the city on rural areas and achieving the goal of common prosperity.

This paper constructs a mathematical model to study China’s urban real estate markets, in which there are different types of demands from house buyers, and housing suppliers adopt the strategy of quality differentiation second-degree price discrimination. Our theoretical result shows that, in China’s case, without government intervention in the housing market, it is almost inevitable that the prices of both housing and the related resources will rocket. To achieve the goal of “houses built for inhabitance”, we put forward a policy scheme to achieve “houses built for inhabitance” in China’s cities from the perspectives of “speculation limitation” and “price control”. We also conduct a numerical analysis to consider the macroeconomic effects of these two policy solutions on the housing market, and we conclude that Chinese authorities should introduce a resale tax in the housing market and learn from Singapore’s experience in housing market regulation.