To find if current dialogue systems use the same, psychotherapist questioning technique as Joseph Weizenbaum's 1960 natural language understanding programme, Eliza, the authors carried out an original experiment comparing five successful artificial dialogue systems, Cleverbot, Elbot, Eugene Goostman, JFred and Ultra Hal with an online version of Eliza. More than one hundred male and female participants with 1st or non-1st English language, age range 13–64, interacted with the systems over the Internet scoring each for conversation ability. Developers of the modern conversation systems show they deploy a variety of techniques to initiate and maintain dialogue learning from interactions with humans over the Internet. Statistical significance shows these dialogue systems are an improvement on their predecessor. Embedded on the web affording round-the-clock interaction the nature of artificial dialogue systems is evolving as these systems learn from the way humans converse. The uses of modern Elizas are proven successful as virtual assistants in e-commerce; their conversational basis is already extending into education. What we can say is modern artificial dialogue systems do talk. They are able to participate in conversation in a way their predecessor Eliza could not: they are able to share personal opinions, relay experience of family dramas, be relevant, but also be vague, and mislead just as humans do.

The slime mould Physarum polycephalum has been used in developing unconventional computing devices for in which the slime mould played a role of a sensing, actuating, and computing device. These devices treated the slime mould as an active living substrate, yet it is a self-consistent living creature which evolved over millions of years and occupied most parts of the world, but in any case, that living entity did not own true cognition, just automated biochemical mechanisms. To "rehabilitate" slime mould from the rank of a purely living electronics element to a "creature of thoughts" we are analyzing the cognitive potential of P. polycephalum. We base our theory of minimal cognition of the slime mould on a bottom-up approach, from the biological and biophysical nature of the slime mould and its regulatory systems using frameworks such as Lyon's biogenic cognition, Muller, di Primio-Lengelerś modifiable pathways, Bateson's "patterns that connect" framework, Maturana's autopoietic network, or proto-consciousness and Morgan's Canon.

This paper provides a new concept for the improvement of human–robot interaction (HRI) models: ‘emotional affordances’. Emotional affordances are all the mechanisms that have emotional content as a way to transmit and/or collect emotional meaning about any context; it can include bodily expressions, social norms, values-laden objects or extended space, among others. With this rich concept, we open the way to new ways to understand the multimodal and complex nature of emotional mechanisms. Based on the grounded emotional mechanisms of human cognition and behaviour (that is, based and result of the bodily structure and its coupled relationship with the natural and/or social environment), the purpose of this paper is focused on the definition of a framework for the design of a taxonomy of emotional affordances, useful for a modal and improved understanding of the domains of emotional interactions that can emerge between humans and robots. This process will make possible in next research steps to define processing modules as well as to elicit visual display outputs (expressing emotions). Consequently, with this project we provide robotic experts with a unified taxonomy of human emotional affordances, useful for the improvement of HRI projects.

Contemporary sciences use a wide and diverse range of computational simulations, including in the areas of aeronautics, chemistry, bioinformatics, social sciences, AI, the physics of elementary particles and most other scientific fields. A simulation is a mathematical model that describes or creates computationally a system process. Simulations are our best cognitive representation of complex reality, that is, our deepest conception of what reality is. In this paper we defend that a simulation is equivalent epistemologically and ontologically with all other types of cognitive models of elements of reality. Therefore, simulations cannot be considered secondary nor weak instruments to approach to the reality analysis