In 2011, an unidentified disease in cattle was reported in Germany and the Netherlands. Clinical signs included fever, decreased milk production, and diarrhea. Metagenomic analysis identified a novel orthobunyavirus, which subsequently was isolated from blood of affected animals. Surveillance was initiated to test malformed newborn animals in the affected region.

In mid September 2008, clinical signs of bluetongue (particularly coronitis) were observed in cows on three different farms in eastern Netherlands (Luttenberg, Heeten, and Barchem), two of which had been vaccinated with an inactivated BTV-8 vaccine (during May-June 2008). Bluetongue virus (BTV) infection was also detected on a fourth farm (Oldenzaal) in the same area while testing for export. BTV RNA was subsequently identified by real time RT-PCR targeting genome-segment (Seg-) 10, in blood samples from each farm. The virus was isolated from the Heeten sample (IAH “dsRNA virus reference collection” [dsRNA-VRC] isolate number NET2008/05) and typed as BTV-6 by RT-PCR targeting Seg-2. Sequencing confirmed the virus type, showing an identical Seg-2 sequence to that of the South African BTV-6 live-vaccine-strain. Although most of the other genome segments also showed very high levels of identity to the BTV-6 vaccine (99.7 to 100%), Seg-10 showed greatest identity (98.4%) to the BTV-2 vaccine (RSAvvv2/02), indicating that NET2008/05 had acquired a different Seg-10 by reassortment. Although Seg-7 from NET2008/05 was also most closely related to the BTV-6 vaccine (99.7/100% nt/aa identity), the Seg-7 sequence derived from the blood sample of the same animal (NET2008/06) was identical to that of the Netherlands BTV-8 (NET2006/04 and NET2007/01). This indicates that the blood contained two different Seg-7 sequences, one of which (from the BTV-6 vaccine) was selected during virus isolation in cell-culture. The predominance of the BTV-8 Seg-7 in the blood sample suggests that the virus was in the process of reassorting with the northern field strain of BTV-8. Two genome segments of the virus showed significant differences from the BTV-6 vaccine, indicating that they had been acquired by reassortment event with BTV-8, and another unknown parental-strain. However, the route by which BTV-6 and BTV-8 entered northern Europe was not established.

Understanding African swine fever virus (ASFV) transmission is essential for strategies to minimize virus spread during an outbreak. ASFV can survive for extended time periods in animal products, carcasses, and the environment. While the ASFV genome was found in environments around infected farms, data on the virus survival in soil are scarce. We investigated different soil matrices spiked with ASFV-positive blood from infected wild boar to see if ASFV can remain infectious in the soil beneath infected carcasses. As expected, ASFV genome detection was possible over the entire sampling period. Soil pH, structure, and ambient temperature played a role in the stability of infectious ASFV. Infectious ASFV was demonstrated in specimens originating from sterile sand for at least three weeks, from beach sand for up to two weeks, from yard soil for one week, and from swamp soil for three days. The virus was not recovered from two acidic forest soils. All risk mitigation experiments with citric acid or calcium hydroxide resulted in complete inactivation. In conclusion, the stability of infectious ASFV is very low in acidic forest soils but rather high in sandy soils. However, given the high variability, treatment of carcass collection points with disinfectants should be considered.

Between August 2010 and February 2011, over 750 deaths were recorded among wild goats (Capra aegagrus, the endangered progenitor of the domestic goat) in Kurdistan. Based on the clinical signs and post‐mortem findings, the involvement of peste des petits ruminants virus (PPRV) was suspected. This was confirmed by laboratory analysis, and the virus was found to be closely related to a Turkish strain isolated in 2000. During the outbreak in wild goats, no disease in domestic animals was reported. Domestic ruminants in the region are routinely vaccinated with an attenuated vaccine based on the ‘Nigeria/75/1’ strain of PPRV. This is the first report of active PPRV infection in Kurdistan and most likely the immunity afforded by vaccination prevented spillover infections. It is therefore recommended to continue with the campaign. Conversely, there is no justification for the use of force to keep the endangered wild goats away from domestic flocks.