We compared two tasks that are widely used in research on mentalizing—false belief stories and animations of rigid geometric shapes that depict social interactions—to investigate whether the neural systems that mediate the representation of others' mental states are consistent across these tasks. Whereas false belief stories activated primarily the anterior paracingulate cortex (APC), the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PC), and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)—components of the distributed neural system for theory of mind (ToM)—the social animations activated an extensive region along nearly the full extent of the superior temporal sulcus, including a locus in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), as well as the frontal operculum and inferior parietal lobule (IPL)—components of the distributed neural system for action understanding—and the fusiform gyrus. These results suggest that the representation of covert mental states that may predict behavior and the representation of intentions that are implied by perceived actions involve distinct neural systems. These results show that the TPJ and the pSTS play dissociable roles in mentalizing and are parts of different distributed neural systems. Because the social animations do not depict articulated body movements, these results also highlight that the perception of the kinematics of actions is not necessary to activate the mirror neuron system, suggesting that this system plays a general role in the representation of intentions and goals of actions. Furthermore, these results suggest that the fusiform gyrus plays a general role in the representation of visual stimuli that signify agency, independent of visual form.

Humans prioritize different semantic qualities of a complex stimulus depending on their behavioral goals. These semantic features are encoded in distributed neural populations, yet it is unclear how attention might operate across these distributed representations. To address this, we presented participants with naturalistic video clips of animals behaving in their natural environments while the participants attended to either behavior or taxonomy. We used models of representational geometry to investigate how attentional allocation affects the distributed neural representation of animal behavior and taxonomy. Attending to animal behavior transiently increased the discriminability of distributed population codes for observed actions in anterior intraparietal, pericentral, and ventral temporal cortices. Attending to animal taxonomy while viewing the same stimuli increased the discriminability of distributed animal category representations in ventral temporal cortex. For both tasks, attention selectively enhanced the discriminability of response patterns along behaviorally relevant dimensions. These findings suggest that behavioral goals alter how the brain extracts semantic features from the visual world. Attention effectively disentangles population responses for downstream read-out by sculpting representational geometry in late-stage perceptual areas.

Personally familiar faces are processed more robustly and efficiently than unfamiliar faces. The human face processing system comprises a core system that analyzes the visual appearance of faces and an extended system for the retrieval of person-knowledge and other nonvisual information. We applied multivariate pattern analysis to fMRI data to investigate aspects of familiarity that are shared by all familiar identities and information that distinguishes specific face identities from each other. Both identity-independent familiarity information and face identity could be decoded in an overlapping set of areas in the core and extended systems. Representational similarity analysis revealed a clear distinction between the two systems and a subdivision of the core system into ventral, dorsal and anterior components. This study provides evidence that activity in the extended system carries information about both individual identities and personal familiarity, while clarifying and extending the organization of the core system for face perception.

We investigated whether personally familiar faces are preferentially processed in conditions of reduced attentional resources and in the absence of conscious awareness. In the first experiment, we used Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) to test the susceptibility of familiar faces and faces of strangers to the attentional blink. In the second experiment, we used continuous flash interocular suppression to render stimuli invisible and measured face detection time for personally familiar faces as compared to faces of strangers. In both experiments we found an advantage for detection of personally familiar faces as compared to faces of strangers. Our data suggest that the identity of faces is processed with reduced attentional resources and even in the absence of awareness. Our results show that this facilitated processing of familiar faces cannot be attributed to detection of low-level visual features and that a learned unique configuration of facial features can influence preconscious perceptual processing.

We designed an fMRI experiment comparing perception of human faces and robotic faces producing emotional expressions. The purpose of our experiment was to investigate engagement of different parts of the social brain by viewing these animate and inanimate agents. Both human and robotic face expressions evoked activity in face-responsive regions in the fusiform gyrus and STS and in the putative human mirror neuron system. These results suggest that these areas mediate perception of agency, independently of whether the agents are living or not. By contrast, the human faces evoked stronger activity than did robotic faces in the medial pFC and the anterior temporal cortex—areas associated with the representation of others' mental states (theory of mind), whereas robotic faces evoked stronger activity in areas associated with perception of objects and mechanical movements. Our data demonstrate that the representation of the distinction between animate and inanimate agents involves areas that participate in attribution of mental stance.