A key theme in safety is the investigation and improvement of work processes and conditions. This is built on a tradition of studying accidents, but there is growing interest in the investigation of everyday work. Researchers have started using terms such as success, normal and everyday work investigations, but behind these can be different activities. This paper makes explicit some considerations behind investigations of everyday work, how these considerations shape an investigation, and how they reflect different schools of thought. These considerations can be used as an aid for designing everyday work investigations for safety and serve as a first step towards critical reflection on investigating everyday work.

Crew resource management (CRM) training for flight crews is widespread and has been credited with improving aviation safety. As other industries have adopted CRM, they have interpreted CRM in different ways. We sought to understand how industries have adopted CRM, regarding its conceptualisation and evaluation. For this, we conducted a systematic review of CRM studies in the Maritime, Nuclear Power, Oil and Gas, and Air Traffic Control industries. We searched three electronic databases (Web of Science, Science Direct, Scopus) and CRM reviews for papers. We analysed these papers on their goals, scope, levers of change, and evaluation. To synthesise, we compared the analysis results across industries. We found that most CRM programs have the broad goals of improving safety and efficiency. However, there are differences in the scope and levers of change between programs, both within and between industries. Most evaluative studies suffer from methodological weaknesses, and the evaluation does not align with how studies conceptualise CRM. These results challenge the assumption that there is a clear link between CRM training and enhanced safety in the analysed industries. Future CRM research needs to provide a clear conceptualisation—how CRM is expected to improve safety—and select evaluation measures consistent with this.

This paper describes and analyses a particular safety practice, the written pre-task risk assessment, commonly referred to as a “Take 5”. The paper draws on data from a trial at a major infrastructure construction project. We conducted interviews and field observations during alternating periods of enforced Take 5 usage, optional Take 5 usage, and banned Take 5 usage. These data, along with evidence from other field studies, were analysed using the method of Functional Interrogation. We found no evidence to support any of the purported mechanisms by which Take 5 might be effective in reducing the risk of workplace accidents. Take 5 does not improve the planning of work, enhance worker heedfulness while conducting work, educate workers about hazards, or assist with organisational awareness and management of hazards. Whilst some workers believe that Take 5 may sometimes be effective, this belief is subject to the “Not for Me” effect, where Take 5 is always believed to be helpful for someone else, at some other time. The adoption and use of Take 5 is most likely to be an adaptive response by individuals and organisations to existing structural pressures. Take 5 provides a social defence, creating an auditable trail of safety work that may reduce anxiety in the present, and deflect blame in the future. Take 5 also serves a signalling function, allowing workers and companies to appear diligent about safety.