FENG YU

Mrs. FENG YU

chongqing, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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7 July 2024 in Managerial and Decision Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZWZehao Wang
Zehao Wang
FYFENG YU
FENG YU
NYNana Yao
Nana Yao
OLOuwen Lin
Ouwen Lin
QLQiyuan Li
Qiyuan Li
BLBowen Liu
Bowen Liu

3 December 2023 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HQHE QING
HE QING
FYFENG YU
FENG YU
ZLZheyu Li
Zheyu Li
The dual-credit policy, as an important emerging policy in the Chinese automotive industry intended to achieve energy savings, emissions reductions, and promote the development of new energy vehicles (NEVs), has attracted considerable attention from scholars. This study investigates how this policy affects the research and development (R&D) levels of both component suppliers and vehicle manufacturers in the automotive supply chain. Assuming the bounded rationality of the participants, we construct a complex dynamic evolutionary model under Stackelberg games to explore the impact of the policy on the dynamic game behavior and equilibrium stability of R&D levels. Furthermore, we examine the influences of various parameters on the R&D level complex system. The findings reveal that the disparity in the proportion of NEVs in the policy should not be too large; otherwise, bifurcation and chaos may occur in the R&D level game system. Moreover, higher supplier research efficiency contributes to the stability of R&D levels, while the higher credit trading price is not suitable for stable R&D levels. This paper theoretically reveals the dynamic impact of the dual-credit policy on the R&D levels in the automotive supply chain, bridging the gap between previous studies assuming decision-makers as fully rational and the reality of bounded rationality. It also provides managerial recommendations for the implementation details of this policy.

1 January 2023 in Fractals
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
FYFENG YU
FENG YU
HZHua Zhao
Hua Zhao
Every enterprise in the supply chain will participate in managing the supply chain. The decisions made by each party will affect the future decisions of other members in the supply chain and themselves. There are trade-offs since the upstream and downstream of the multi-supply chain tackle problems from different perspectives based on their interests. With the increasing competition and cooperation among enterprises in multi-supply chains, game theory is widely used to analyze the competition and collaboration among enterprises. This study combines game theory and auction theory to obtain the relative optimal allocation through double auctions for multi-objective optimization. Nevertheless, there are a few issues, including the number of iterations and the potential for local monopoly in double auctions. To this end, the generalized genetic particle swarm optimization (GGPSO) algorithm is introduced to improve the double auctions mechanism, and finally, the global optimization of the supply chain is achieved. The simulation results show that the proposed method can efficiently complete the distribution and pricing among multi-supply chains and compensate the competing buyers with higher average quotations and the competing sellers with lower average quotes. Additionally, the GGPSO algorithm presented in this paper has a good performance in terms of the time needed to obtain the optimal solution, which is conducive to the global optimization of the supply chain.

1 June 2026 in Annals of Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
KZKaiyang Zhong
Kaiyang Zhong
FYFENG YU
FENG YU
ZWZehao Wang
Zehao Wang
ZZZhiguo Zhong
Zhiguo Zhong
YLYifei Lv
Yifei Lv

20 June 2024 in Finance Research Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZWZixuan Wang
Zixuan Wang
FYFENG YU
FENG YU
YLYan Li
Yan Li
ZWZehao Wang
Zehao Wang
OLOuwen Lin
Ouwen Lin

4 December 2023 in Research Square
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
HZHua Zhao
Hua Zhao
FYFENG YU
FENG YU
PLPing Li
Ping Li
ZWZhuoran Wu
Zhuoran Wu
With the growing emphasis on environmental sustainability and heightened market competition, the development and sale of green products have assumed a pivotal role in the operations of manufacturers. However, due to the constraints of bounded rationality within firms, the issue of dynamic pricing may rise. In light of this context, this paper employs a dual-channel framework to investigate the manufacturer’s green product development and pricing problem over a continuous timeframe. In this framework, the manufacturer markets traditional products through offline retailers while simultaneously launching green products via an online platform. In recognition of the practicality of multi-period operations, we also take online delay time lag, price adjustment speed, green input level, and consumer channel loyalty into account and explore their impacts on the equilibrium price of the dual-channel supply chain of green products. Utilizing the eigenvalue method, we delve into the dynamic pricing game and ascertain the existence of the unique Nash equilibrium point. Our research establishes critical thresholds for delay time lags and green inputs. Beyond these thresholds, equilibrium destabilizes, resulting in price unpredictability. Furthermore, we identify a crucial maximum for the rate at which manufacturers modify prices for green products in online markets. If this adjustment rate falls below the threshold, the system maintains stability. Additionally, both the extent of green inputs and the customer channel loyalty of manufacturers significantly impact both equilibrium stability and the resulting price within the system.