Tatsuya Oyama

Mr. Tatsuya Oyama


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 March 2022 in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
TOTatsuya Oyama
Tatsuya Oyama
SOShunsuke Okura
Shunsuke Okura
KYKota Yoshida
Kota Yoshida
TFTakeshi Fujino
Takeshi Fujino
A backdoor attack is a type of attack method inducing deep neural network (DNN) misclassification. An adversary mixes poison data, which consist of images tampered with adversarial marks at specific locations and of adversarial target classes, into a training dataset. The backdoor model classifies only images with adversarial marks into an adversarial target class and other images into the correct classes. However, the attack performance degrades sharply when the location of the adversarial marks is slightly shifted. An adversarial mark that induces the misclassification of a DNN is usually applied when a picture is taken, so the backdoor attack will have difficulty succeeding in the physical world because the adversarial mark position fluctuates. This paper proposes a new approach in which an adversarial mark is applied using fault injection on the mobile industry processor interface (MIPI) between an image sensor and the image recognition processor. Two independent attack drivers are electrically connected to the MIPI data lane in our attack system. While almost all image signals are transferred from the sensor to the processor without tampering by canceling the attack signal between the two drivers, the adversarial mark is injected into a given location of the image signal by activating the attack signal generated by the two attack drivers. In an experiment, the DNN was implemented on a Raspberry pi 4 to classify MNIST handwritten images transferred from the image sensor over the MIPI. The adversarial mark successfully appeared in a specific small part of the MNIST images using our attack system. The success rate of the backdoor attack using this adversarial mark was 91%, which is much higher than the 18% rate achieved using conventional input image tampering.

14 May 2023 in Sensors
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
TOTatsuya Oyama
Tatsuya Oyama
SOShunsuke Okura
Shunsuke Okura
KYKota Yoshida
Kota Yoshida
TFTakeshi Fujino
Takeshi Fujino
A backdoor attack is a type of attack method that induces deep neural network (DNN) misclassification. The adversary who aims to trigger the backdoor attack inputs the image with a specific pattern (the adversarial mark) into the DNN model (backdoor model). In general, the adversary mark is created on the physical object input to an image by capturing a photo. With this conventional method, the success of the backdoor attack is not stable because the size and position change depending on the shooting environment. So far, we have proposed a method of creating an adversarial mark for triggering backdoor attacks by means of a fault injection attack on the mobile industry processor interface (MIPI), which is the image sensor interface. We propose the image tampering model, with which the adversarial mark can be generated in the actual fault injection to create the adversarial mark pattern. Then, the backdoor model was trained with poison data images, which the proposed simulation model created. We conducted a backdoor attack experiment using a backdoor model trained on a dataset containing 5% poison data. The clean data accuracy in normal operation was 91%; nevertheless, the attack success rate with fault injection was 83%.

10 September 2021 in Sensors
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SOShunsuke Okura
Shunsuke Okura
MAMasanori Aoki
Masanori Aoki
TOTatsuya Oyama
Tatsuya Oyama
MSMasayoshi Shirahata
Masayoshi Shirahata
TFTakeshi Fujino
Takeshi Fujino
ITIsao Takayanagi
Isao Takayanagi
In order to realize image information security starting from the data source, challenge–response (CR) device authentication, based on a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) with a 2 Mpixel CMOS image sensor (CIS), is studied, in which variation of the transistor in the pixel array is utilized. As each CR pair can be used only once to make the CIS PUF resistant to the modeling attack, CR authentication with CIS can be carried out 4050 times, with basic post-processing to generate the PUF ID. If a larger number of authentications is required, advanced post-processing using Lehmer encoding can be utilized to carry out authentication 14,858 times. According to the PUF performance evaluation, the authentication error rate is less than 0.001 ppm. Furthermore, the area overhead of the CIS chip for the basic and advanced post-processing is only 1% and 2%, respectively, based on a Verilog HDL model circuit design.

5 November 2024 in Sensors
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
TOTatsuya Oyama
Tatsuya Oyama
MHManami Hagizaki
Manami Hagizaki
SOShunsuke Okura
Shunsuke Okura
TFTakeshi Fujino
Takeshi Fujino
Since image recognition systems use image data acquired by image sensors for analysis by AI technology, an important security issue is guaranteeing the authenticity of data transmitted from image sensors to successfully perform inference using AI. There have been reports of physical attacks on image sensor interfaces by tampering with images to cause misclassifications in AI classification results. As a countermeasure against these attacks, it is effective to add authenticity to image data with a message authentication code (MAC). For the implementation of this, it is important to have technologies for generating MAC keys on image sensors and to create an environment for secure MAC verification on the host device. For MAC key generation, we used the CIS-PUF technology, which generates MAC keys from PUF responses and random numbers from CMOS image sensor variations. For the secure MAC verification, we used TEE technology, which executes security-critical processes in an environment isolated from the normal operating system. In this study, we propose and demonstrate an image tampering detection system based on MAC verification with CIS-PUF and OP-TEE in an open portable TEE on an ARM processor. In the experiments, we demonstrated a system that computed and transmitted MAC for captured images using the CIS-PUF key and then performed MAC verification in the secure world of the OP-TEE.

12 May 2025 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YRYuki ROGI
Yuki ROGI
MHManami Hagizaki
Manami Hagizaki
TOTatsuya Oyama
Tatsuya Oyama
HOHiroaki Ogawa
Hiroaki Ogawa
KYKota Yoshida
Kota Yoshida
SOShunsuke Okura
Shunsuke Okura
The MIPI (Mobile Industry Processor Interface) Alliance provides a security framework for in-vehicle network connections between sensors and processing electronic control units (ECUs). One approach within this framework is data integrity verification for sensors with limited hardware resources. In this paper, the security risks associated with image sensor data are described. Adversarial examples (AEs) targeting the MIPI interface can induce misclassification, making image data integrity verification essential. A CMOS image sensor with a message authentication code (CIS-MAC) is then proposed as a defense mechanism starting from the image sensor to protect image data from malicious manipulations, such as AE attacks. Evaluation results of the physically unclonable function (PUF) response and random number, which are utilized for generating the cryptographic key and MAC tag, are presented using a 2 Mpixel CMOS image sensor. The area of the CIS-MAC circuit is estimated based on a Verilog HDL design and synthesis using a 0.18 μm CMOS process. Various hash topologies are evaluated to select a hash function suitable for key generation and MAC tag generation within the CMOS image sensor. The estimated area of the CIS-MAC circuit is 67 kGE and 0.86mm2, demonstrating feasibility for implementation in a CMOS image sensor typically fabricated using analog process technology.