In this paper, the feasibility of peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading in a voltage-constrained grid-connected network is studied. In particular, a local voltage management scheme is proposed that takes network constraints into consideration to instruct the prosumers to trade energy frequently in the P2P market. A coalition graph game-based P2P energy trading framework is developed, in which prosumers can form the coalition to negotiate and decide on the energy trading parameters, such as trading quantities and prices. The Myerson value rule is used to allocate the total payoff of the proposed game fairly among the participating prosumers. Further, the stability of the proposed coalition structure is confirmed. Several simulation results are provided to verify the effectiveness of the developed P2P trading model. The simulation results show that the proposed P2P trading framework can enable prosumers to export power without causing high voltage problem in the network, and help prosumers cut down a significant portion of their overall electricity costs compared to the feed-in-tariff and coalition game model without mutual negotiations.

Thi s paper studies the applicability of peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading in a grid-tied network. The main objectives are to understand the impact of the financial P2P energy trading on the network operation, and thus demonstrate the importance of taking various issues related to power network into account while designing a practical P2P trading scheme. To do so, a simple mechanism is developed for energy trading among prosumers without considering any network constraints, as done by many existing studies. Once the trading parameters, such as the energy traded by each prosumer in the P2P market and the price per unit of energy are determined, the developed scheme is tested on a low-voltage (LV) network model to check its feasibility of deployment in a real P2P network. It is shown that although the considered trading scheme is economically beneficial to the participating prosumers compared to the existing incentive mechanisms (such as feed-in-tariff), it could be unfit for real deployment due to violating bus voltage limits during multiple P2P trading executed simultaneously. Further, the grid operator may experience financial losses for compensating the losses during P2P transactions.