In this paper, we examine the influences of vertical and horizontal cooperation models on the optimal decisions and performance of a low-carbon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a manufacturer and two retailers, and study optimal operation in the competitive pricing, competitive the low-carbon promotion, the carbon emission reduction, the used-products collection and the profits. We consider the completely decentralized model, M-R vertical cooperation model, R-R horizontal cooperation model, M-R-R vertical and horizontal cooperation model and completely centralized model, and also identify the optimal decision results and profits. It can be observed from a systematic comparison and numerical analysis that the completely centralized model is best in all optimal decision results among all models. In semi-cooperation, the M-R vertical cooperation model is positive, the R-R horizontal cooperation model is passive, and the positivity of the M-R-R vertical and horizontal cooperation model decreases with competitive intensity increasing in the used-products returning, carbon emissions reduction level, low-carbon promotion effort and the profits of the manufacturer and the entire supply chain.

In the context of economic globalization, coastal port logistics has gradually become a focus of economic development, and the proper management of coastal port logistics performance is the main way to realize the high-efficiency operation of coastal ports, drives the direct economic development of the hinterland, and enhances import and export trade market competitiveness. Accordingly, this study was aimed to measure port logistics efficiency and explore its path of improvement for China’s coastal ports during the 2014–2018 period with a four-stage DEA model, including a Tobit model. The results of this study show that most of the coastal ports in China have emphasized their size more than their planning. During the study period, improving road network construction and the economic level in hinterland port cities was conducive to improving port logistics efficiency, but tertiary industry investment and foreign trade levels were negatively correlated with coastal port logistics efficiency.

The marine green fuel supply chain is a crucial component in the development of green ports. Focusing on the issue of cooperative contracts between the port and green marine fuel supplier within the marine green fuel supply chain, first, a two-echelon marine green fuel supply chain optimization model consisting of a green marine fuel supplier and a port was constructed. Second, the changes in profits and decisions of a green marine fuel supplier and a port were compared under four scenarios: no contract, cost-sharing contract, revenue-sharing contract, and combined revenue-sharing + cost-sharing contract. Finally, the propositions were validated using numerical simulation methods. The research findings show that, in terms of revenue, the combined profits of a port and green marine fuel supplier under the combined revenue-sharing + cost-sharing contract exceeded those under the revenue-sharing contract alone. Regarding the sales price of marine green fuel and bunkering service quality, these factors peaked under the cost-sharing contract and were at their lowest under the revenue-sharing contract. An increase in the port’s investment proportion in marine green fuel bunkering service quality led to decreases in the bunkering volume, sales price, wholesale price, and bunkering service quality of marine green fuel under both the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing + cost-sharing contract. Additionally, the higher proportion of revenue shared by the port with the green marine fuel supplier resulted in lower sales price, wholesale price, and bunkering service quality of green marine fuel under both the revenue-sharing contract and revenue-sharing + cost-sharing contract.

In this paper, we examine the influences of different game structures on the optimal decisions and performance of a low-carbon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with price and carbon emission level dependent market demands. We consider centralized and decentralized game theoretic models and develop two coordination mechanisms of a low-carbon CLSC with one manufacturer and one retailer. We also identify the optimal decisions of the collection level, carbon emission reduction level, and pricing under different situations, namely centralized decision, manufacturer-led, retailer-led, and Vertical Nash. It can be observed from a systematic comparison and numerical analysis that the Vertical Nash structure is the best in the levels of the carbon emission reduction, the used-product collection, the retail price, and the entire supply chain's profit under the decentralized decision. The cooperatively reducing carbon emission is positive for the carbon emission reduction and collection under a manufacturer-led structure.

Due to the explosive growth trend of cross-border e-commerce, a series of problems such as high transportation costs and insufficient publicity are to be solved urgently by researching on supply chain from both decision-making and coordination perspectives. Under the four-incomplete cooperative Stackelberg decision-making modes of cross-border e-commerce supply chain members, the transportation cost of overseas suppliers and the promotion strategy of domestic retailers determine the profit of the supply chain together and further influence the choice of the optimal decision-making plan. Furthermore, the Shapley value method and full cooperative income incremental sharing mechanism are used to redistribute the profits under different cooperation modes, and it is expected to provide scientific decision-making reference for domestic cross-border e-commerce enterprises to rationally choose cooperative relationships.