Sam Ganzfried

Dr. Sam Ganzfried


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 June 2018 in Games
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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SGSam Ganzfried
Sam Ganzfried
ANAustin Nowak
Austin Nowak
JPJoannier Pinales
Joannier Pinales
Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, but no guarantees in non-zero-sum games or in games with more than two players. We describe an agent that is able to defeat a variety of realistic opponents using an exact Nash equilibrium strategy in a three-player imperfect-information game. This shows that, despite a lack of theoretical guarantees, agents based on Nash equilibrium strategies can be successful in multiplayer games after all.

1 June 2021 in Games
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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SGSam Ganzfried
Sam Ganzfried
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games—in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite—is far more challenging. Nonetheless, many real-world domains have continuous action spaces, e.g., where actions refer to an amount of time, money, or other resource that is naturally modeled as being real-valued as opposed to integral. We present a new algorithm for approximating Nash equilibrium strategies in continuous games. In addition to two-player zero-sum games, our algorithm also applies to multiplayer games and games with imperfect information. We experiment with our algorithm on a continuous imperfect-information Blotto game, in which two players distribute resources over multiple battlefields. Blotto games have frequently been used to model national security scenarios and have also been applied to electoral competition and auction theory. Experiments show that our algorithm is able to quickly compute close approximations of Nash equilibrium strategies for this game.

6 November 2017 in Games
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SGSam Ganzfried
Sam Ganzfried
FYFarzana Yusuf
Farzana Yusuf
Algorithms for equilibrium computation generally make no attempt to ensure that the computed strategies are understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest poker agents are represented as massive binary files. In many situations, we would like to compute strategies that can actually be implemented by humans, who may have computational limitations and may only be able to remember a small number of features or components of the strategies that have been computed. For example, a human poker player or military leader may not have access to large precomputed tables when making real-time strategic decisions. We study poker games where private information distributions can be arbitrary (i.e., players are dealt cards from different distributions, which depicts the phenomenon in large real poker games where at some points in the hand players have different distribution of hand strength by applying Bayes’ rule given the history of play in the hand thus far). We create a large training set of game instances and solutions, by randomly selecting the information probabilities, and present algorithms that learn from the training instances to perform well in games with unseen distributions. We are able to conclude several new fundamental rules about poker strategy that can be easily implemented by humans.


25 November 2020
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
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SGSam Ganzfried
Sam Ganzfried
CLConner Laughlin
Conner Laughlin
CMCharles Morefield
Charles Morefield

3 February 2026 in Games
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SGSam Ganzfried
Sam Ganzfried
There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are scalable to large games and have convergence guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, they do not guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games. We present an approach for exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer imperfect-information games that solves a quadratically-constrained program based on a nonlinear complementarity problem formulation from the sequence-form game representation. This approach capitalizes on recent advances for solving nonconvex quadratic programs. Our algorithm is able to quickly solve three-player Kuhn poker after removal of dominated actions. Of the available algorithms in the Gambit software suite, only the logit quantal response approach is successfully able to solve the game; however, the approach takes longer than our algorithm and also involves a degree of approximation. Our formulation also leads to a new approach for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer normal-form games which we demonstrate to outperform a previous quadratically-constrained program formulation.