John Hacker-Wright

Dr. John Hacker-Wright


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2009 in Philosophy
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JHJohn Hacker-Wright
John Hacker-Wright
John McDowell has argued that for human needs to matter in practical deliberation, we must have already acquired the full range of character traits that are imparted by an ethical upbringing. Since our upbringings can diverge considerably, his argument makes trouble for any Aristotelian ethical naturalism that wants to support a single set of moral virtues. I argue here that there is a story to be told about the normal course of human life according to which it is no coincidence that there is agreement on the virtues. Because we are creatures who arrive at personhood only by learning from others in a relation of dependency, we cannot help but see ourselves as creatures for whom non-instrumental rationality is the norm. Those who train others in personhood must view the trainee's interests as having a value independent of their interests and must imbue the trainee with a sense of that value. Extending and preserving the sense of self-worth that we must acquire if we are to acquire personhood requires we see ourselves as creatures who need something like the virtues.

1 March 2012 in The Journal of Value Inquiry
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JHJohn Hacker-Wright
John Hacker-Wright

14 July 2009 in Ratio
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JHJohn Hacker-Wright
John Hacker-Wright

5 March 2010 in The Journal of Value Inquiry
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JHJohn Hacker-Wright
John Hacker-Wright

1 January 2007 in Philosophy
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JHJohn Hacker-Wright
John Hacker-Wright
My contention is that virtue ethics offers an important critique of traditional philosophical conceptions of moral status as well as an alternative view of important moral issues held to depend on moral status. I argue that the scope of entities that deserve consideration depends on our conception of the demands of virtues like justice; which entities deserve consideration emerges from a moral view of a world shaped by that conception. The deepest disputes about moral status depend on conflicting conceptions of justice. I advocate a conception of the virtue of justice that can account for the cases that pose problems for the legalistic views of moral status and discuss what ideal moral debate looks like on this view.

6 February 2015 in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
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JHJohn Hacker-Wright
John Hacker-Wright