With the proposal of China’s “carbon peak, carbon neutral” strategy, the increasing awareness of low carbon production among consumers, and the government’s introduction of carbon trading mechanism and low carbon consumption subsidy policies, enterprises are facing good opportunities for development. However, how the government can reasonably formulate low carbon policies and how enterprises can implement optimal low-carbon production decisions are still key issues in China’s low-carbon transition development. In this context, this paper is based on the carbon trading mechanism and carbon consumption subsidies. In this context, based on the carbon trading mechanism, this paper focuses on green production and green consumption, considers the impact of low-carbon consumer preferences and government subsidies on enterprises’ low-carbon production decisions, and uses the optimal theory to study the optimal pricing strategy and the optimal carbon reduction strategy. The study shows that the increase in carbon price has a positive effect on the increase in enterprise profit; the increase of carbon emission has a negative effect on the increase of enterprise profit and the high carbon price will intensify this effect. In addition, changing the intensity of government subsidies to consumers will lead to the change of enterprise carbon emission strategy. The study of this paper provides a certain reference for the government to reasonably formulate carbon trading prices and consumer low-carbon subsidies. In addition, considering consumer low-carbon preferences is also conducive to promoting green production practices of enterprises, thus promoting the realization of the carbon neutral strategy.

In order to build a more comprehensive emergency disposal and transportation network system for medical waste, it is necessary to consider various uncertain factors and data characteristics. Therefore, in the context of intelligent transportation, this article considers the uncertainty of the quantity and regional population density of infectious medical waste generation as well as the emergency disposal of infectious medical waste under multi-cycle and multi-objective conditions, and it constructs a multi-cycle emergency disposal logistics network optimization model for infectious medical waste under uncertain conditions. Through deterministic transformation of the model and data mining of the medical waste disposal logistics network in Wuhan, China, the multi-objective model under uncertain conditions was also solved and sensitivity analyzed using the MOPSO-NSGA2 intelligent algorithm, verifying the effectiveness and superiority of the algorithm.

With the acceleration of Chinese industrialization, industrial wastewater is discharged in large quantities, leading to a groundwater environment with high ammonia nitrogen characteristics in many places, which seriously endangers people’s health and makes the treatment of ammonia nitrogen by enterprises an urgent issue. Therefore, based on the principle of “no-fault responsibility”, this paper combines China’s pollution trading rights policy and the reward and punishment distribution mechanism to provide a three-party governance model for groundwater ammonia nitrogen treatment under the benefit sharing of emissions trading. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of groundwater ammonia nitrogen pollution treatment among sewage discharge enterprises, third-party governance enterprises and local governments, the role mechanisms of the strategic choices of different participating actors are analyzed. Finally, the validity of the model is verified via simulation, and the influence of key variables on the evolutionary stability of the system and the strategic choices of the participating parties under different situations are discussed. The research results show that setting reasonable reward and punishment allocation coefficients is the basis for promoting active pollution treatment among sewage discharge enterprises and third-party governance enterprises; a change in pollution rights trading revenue is a key factor affecting the strategic choices of the three parties; sewage discharge enterprises show stronger revenue sensitivity than third-party governance enterprises; and an environmental treatment credit system built by the government can effectively enhance the enthusiasm of enterprises to control pollution. Based on the research results of this paper, the participation of third-party governance enterprises in pollution rights trading is explored, which effectively promotes enterprises to actively carry out groundwater ammonia nitrogen treatment and provides a reference for the government to improve the construction of a sustainable development system for the water environment.

The excessive use of fossil energy has led to a yearly increase in carbon dioxide and atmospheric pollutant emissions, and climate change has become increasingly prominent, seriously affecting people’s daily lives and physical and mental health. According to statistics, rising temperatures and extreme weather phenomena due to climate change have led to a 68% increase in heat-related deaths today compared to the period between 2000 and 2004, and a 61% increase in the number of days humans face high fire risks in the same period. Currently, in order to achieve synergistic economic and environmental development and enhance the health co-benefits of carbon emission reduction, it is urgent for high-energy-consuming enterprises to make sound low-carbon technology investment decisions. Therefore, in this paper, under the carbon quota and trading policy and carbon tax policy, and considering the existence of low-carbon preferences of consumers, the financial constraints of upstream high energy-consuming enterprises and sufficient funds of downstream retailers, a low-carbon technology investment decision model under intra-supply chain financing is constructed using Stackelberg game theory. Moreover, by applying the inverse induction method, we solve the optimal decision of low-carbon technology investment with three different subsidy methods: no subsidy, cost subsidy and product subsidy. Finally, the validity of the model is verified by numerical simulation, and the effects of different influencing factors on low-carbon technology investment are analyzed. The results show that: (1) the reasonable formulation of carbon trading price, carbon tax rate, cost subsidy ratio and product subsidy coefficient are important factors to promote enterprises’ low-carbon technology investment; (2) the improvement of consumers’ low-carbon preference level and the reduction in repayment interest rate can promote enterprises’ investment; (3) compared with no subsidy, cost subsidy and product subsidy can effectively improve enterprises’ low-carbon technology investment enthusiasm, and the effect of product subsidy is better than that of cost subsidy. The effect of product subsidies is better than that of cost subsidies. This paper aims to provide suggestions for the government to refine low-carbon technology investment incentive policies and for enterprises to optimize low-carbon technology investment decisions, so as to enhance the healthy co-benefits of carbon emission reduction and achieve green and sustainable economic development.