Purpose: The present paper is aimed at 1) performing a systematic literature review (SLR) on applications in the perspective of sustainable agri-food supply chain (SC) of blockchain technology (BCT); 2) analyzing the selected literature, focusing on the advantages of the sustainable uses of the blockchain of the aforementioned SC and 3) presenting an outlook and research directions capable of addressing unresolved problems.Design/methodology/approach: The SLR was conducted using detailed criteria to identify academic articles. Moreover, specific keywords and databases were used. The time frame considered included the years 2010–2020.Findings: The review analysis indicates that the use of BCT or BCT supported by ICT/IoT contributes to sustainability of agri-food production. However, this technology can lead to several challenges such as scalability, privacy leakage, high cost and connectivity problems.Research limitations/implications: The paper demonstrates that BCT can widely use agri-food supply chain due to its intrinsic characteristics. However, it is not excluded that the criteria chosen may not have identified important articles regarding BCT, the agri-food sector and sustainability.Originality/value: Although the body of academic literature published on this topic is expansive, the effect of BCT on the agri-food SC's sustainability aspects has not yet been adequately analyzed. Thus, the article is aimed at investigating how BCT is used in the SC. In particular, the article is intended to update information about BCT and its impact on sustainability.
Consider a water supplier who determines sales rates with the goals of maximizing profits, protecting consumer welfare, and ensuring adequate future water supplies. Buyers are differentiated and can use the water for domestic, agricultural, and industrial purposes. We propose a leader-follower finite-horizon differential game. The leader (the water supplier) determines the selling price and the followers (consumers) react by requesting their optimal amount of water. We calculate a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium assuming that all user demand is satisfied (interior equilibrium). We compare two different tariff schemes: linear tariffs (the price paid is a multiple of the volume of water purchased), and increasing block tariffs (the unit price is lower for quantities of water that do not exceed a fixed threshold). We show that block pricing is never optimal and linear pricing is always preferred.
1 August 2019 in Applied Mathematics and Computation